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THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF 
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
TAYLOR J. PHILLIPS* 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) have vigorously enforced the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign 
government officials, and the statute provides for significant civil and 
criminal sanctions. Settling and remediating violations can cost corporate 
defendants millions, with several corporate enforcement actions exceeding 
$100 million in sanctions. Moreover, enforcement actions related to the 
FCPA often are not brought until many years after the alleged violations. 
Because the massive potential liabilities associated with an FCPA vio-
lation may not manifest themselves until years after the violation occurred, 
prospective corporate acquirers have become acutely sensitive to the risk 
of “buying” an FCPA liability during a merger or an acquisition. Tradi-
tionally, an acquirer could avoid liabilities of the seller by structuring the 
acquisition as an asset purchase. Under the law of most U.S. jurisdictions, 
a court will not usually look beyond the allocation of liabilities in an asset 
purchase agreement, even when the acquirer purchases substantially all of 
the assets of the seller. 
Despite this general rule, even asset purchase agreements cannot con-
tract around certain liabilities that arise from federal law. In several cases, 
the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have imposed liability on 
good faith, arm’s-length asset purchasers through the federal common law 
of successor liability. 
In the FCPA context, there is no precedent directly on point. Influential 
guidance from the DOJ and SEC, however, emphasizes “successor liability” 
enforcement actions while failing to distinguish between companies that are 
“successors” by reason of a merger and “successors” by reason of an asset 
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purchase.1 This silence by enforcers may lead overly conservative acquirers 
to abandon transactions out of an unfounded (but understandable) fear of 
being held liable for the violations of the seller, even when acquisitions 
would be socially and economically beneficial and likely could be accom-
plished without FCPA successor liability through an asset purchase.2 
This Article concludes that asset purchasers typically cannot be held 
civilly liable for the pre-acquisition FCPA violations of sellers because the 
rule of decision for successor liability in FCPA cases is determined by state, 
not federal law, and the law of most states does not impose successor liabil-
ity on arm’s-length asset purchasers. This conclusion is even stronger with 
respect to criminal FCPA liability because the remedial policy rationales 
that underlie expansive civil successor liability doctrines are not present in 
criminal law. 
                                                                                                                         
1 See Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and Enforcement Division 
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 28 (Nov. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Resource Guide], available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
2 The lack of clarity from enforcers appears to have led a number of large law firms to 
assert, in publicly available articles, newsletters, and presentations, that an asset purchaser 
can be liable for the FCPA violations of a seller. These conclusions may have been influ-
enced by the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which implies that criminal 
history transfers when one company purchases the ongoing business of another through 
an asset purchase. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5 cmt. n.6 (2013). 
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I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Generally 
The FCPA, codified as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the “Exchange Act”), includes anti-bribery provisions and accounting 
provisions. The anti-bribery provisions prohibit corruptly offering anything 
of value to a foreign government official for the purpose of influencing the 
official to assist the offeror in the obtaining or retaining of business.3 
Companies that are “issuers” within the meaning of the Exchange Act 
also must comply with the accounting provisions of the FCPA.4 The books-
and-records provisions of the FCPA require issuers to “make and keep 
books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”5 
Issuers are also required to maintain a system of internal compliance con-
trols that “provide[] reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in 
accordance” with generally accepted accounting principles.6 Collectively, 
the books-and-records and internal controls provisions are referred to as the 
accounting provisions. 
The FCPA is enforced by the DOJ and the SEC.7 The DOJ handles 
criminal enforcement, as well as civil enforcement against non-issuer com-
panies and their officers, directors, employees, and agents.8 The SEC is 
authorized to bring civil suits against issuers and their officers, directors, 
employees, and agents.9 
The DOJ and SEC can seek devastating sanctions for FCPA violations. 
For individuals, sanctions for violating the anti-bribery provisions can in-
clude imprisonment of up to five years and fines of up to $100,000 per 
violation.10 For companies, anti-bribery sanctions may result in fines of up 
to $2,000,000 per violation.11 Under the Alternative Fines Act, courts can 
                                                                                                                         
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2012). 
4 See id. § 78c(a)(8) (defining “issuer”). 
5 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
6 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
7 There is no private right of action under the FCPA. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 
915 F.2d 1024, 1024 (6th Cir. 1990). 
8 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 4. 
9 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
10 §§ 78ff(c)(2)(A), 78dd-2(g)(2)(A). A willful violation of the accounting provisions 
can result in a fine of $5,000,000 and imprisonment up to twenty years. § 78ff(a). 
11 §§ 78ff(c)(1)(A), 78dd-2(g)(1)(A). A willful violation of the accounting provisions 
can result in a fine of $25,000,000. § 78ff(a). 
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impose penalties equal to twice the benefit gained by the defendant in mak-
ing the improper payment.12 Furthermore, although the statute of limitations 
for a substantive violation of the FCPA is five years,13 the government has 
used numerous methods to extend the time in which it can prosecute an 
FCPA-related offense,14 resulting in defendants being penalized for conduct 
many years from the date of the alleged violation.15 
Although the FCPA does not create a private right of action, companies 
often face more than just the fines and penalties assessed by the govern-
ment.16 Collateral consequences of an FCPA conviction may include denial 
of export privileges and debarment from doing business with the United 
States government.17 In the wake of disclosing FCPA investigations, public 
companies frequently suffer stock drops and concomitant shareholder suits.18 
Additionally, the professional fees and costs associated with an FCPA 
investigation may be just as significant as the fines and penalties them-
selves. For example, in the largest FCPA settlement in history, Siemens 
resolved alleged FCPA violations for $800 million.19 In addition to paying 
$800 million to the U.S. Treasury, Siemens paid its attorneys, accountants, 
and other professionals $1 billion in fees and costs related to the investiga-
tion, including $100 million for document review alone.20 The staggering  
                                                                                                                         
12 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2012). 
13 See SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2462’s catchall five year statute of limitations in an FCPA case). 
14 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3292 (2012) (permitting a court to toll the statute of limitations 
for up to three years if the government meets certain conditions, including requesting infor-
mation from a foreign government). Also, charging conspiracy—a continuing offense—
permits the government to bring charges within five years of the last overt act committed 
in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 227 (1946). 
15 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 4, United States v. Total, S.A., No. 1:13-
cr-239 (E.D. Va. May 29, 2013) (noting that “most of the underlying conduct occurred in the 
1990s and early 2000s,” more than a decade before the criminal information was filed). 
16 See O’Melveny & Myers LLP, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: AN O’MELVENY 
HANDBOOK 26–28 (6th ed. 2009), available at http://www.omm.com/files/upload/OMelveny 
Myers_Sixth_Edition_FCPA_Handbook.pdf. 
17 See 22 C.F.R. §§ 126.7(a)(3)–(4), 120.27(a)(6) (2014); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (2013). 
18 See Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation 
Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1223–27 
(2012). 
19 Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2012), http:// 
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443862604578028462294611352. 
20 Nathan Vardi, Feds Charge Former Siemens Executives with Bribery, FORBES 
(Dec. 13, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2011/12/13/feds-charge 
-former-siemens-executives-with-bribery/; Palazzolo, supra note 19. 
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level of professional fees incurred during FCPA investigations is driven 
partly by the multijurisdictional nature of anti-corruption investigations. 
By definition, an alleged anti-bribery offense involves conduct related to 
another country, and thus often requires the retention of professionals in 
multiple jurisdictions.21 Furthermore, upon discovering a potential FCPA 
violation in one jurisdiction, questionable payments in other jurisdictions 
or business units may be identified.22 As the investigation expands to other 
jurisdictions—and sometimes other jurisdictions’ enforcement authorities— 
costs go up.23 
The high stakes and high costs often lead corporate defendants to re-
solve alleged FCPA violations out of court.24 In addition to the monetary 
cost of a settlement, however, defendants may continue to face significant 
consequences. As part of negotiated resolutions, the government sometimes 
requires corporate defendants to retain monitors for one to three years 
after the resolutions.25 A monitor typically has access to corporate books, 
                                                                                                                         
21 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 19. 
22 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 15 (Sept. 5, 2013) 
(“The Audit Committee ... is conducting an internal investigation into, among other things, 
alleged violations of the [FCPA] ... in connection with foreign subsidiaries, including Wal-
Mart de México .... Inquiries or investigations regarding allegations of potential FCPA 
violations have been commenced in a number of foreign markets where the Company op-
erates, including, but not limited to, Brazil, China[,] and India.”); Embraer S.A., Report 
of Foreign Private Issuer (Form 6-K) 9 (Mar. 13, 2013) (“We received a subpoena from 
the SEC in September, 2010 .... In response to this SEC-issued subpoena and associated 
inquiries into the possibility of non-compliance with [FCPA], we retained outside counsel 
to conduct an internal investigation on transactions carried out in three specific countries. 
Further, the Company has voluntarily expanded the scope of the internal investigation to 
include two additional countries ....”). 
23 See, e.g., Diebold, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 6 (Feb. 14, 2011) (“As pre-
viously disclosed, Diebold is conducting a global internal review of its compliance with the 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) .... As a result of the internal review progress-
ing to more complex operations located in broader geographies, as well as complying with 
requests from regulators, costs associated with the FCPA review increased substantially in 
the fourth quarter.”). 
24 See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 
(2010) (written testimony of Andrew Weissmann) [hereinafter Weissmann Testimony], 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG-111shrg66 
921.pdf (“Commercial organizations are rarely positioned to litigate an FCPA enforce-
ment action to its conclusion and the risk of serious jail time for individual defendants 
has led most to plead.”). 
25  See generally F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant, & Veronica S. Root, 
Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011). 
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records, and employees, and reports directly to the government.26 The de-
fendant, of course, is obligated to pay the monitor’s professional fees.27 
B. Recent Developments in FCPA Enforcement 
Although the FCPA was enacted in 1977, enforcement has exploded in 
the past ten years.28 As touted by the DOJ, nine of the top ten resolutions 
(by settlement value) were reached between 2009 and 2013.29 By 2010, 
FCPA fines comprised half of all DOJ Criminal Division penalties.30 In 
2013, the chief of the DOJ’s FCPA unit said, “[w]e have more prosecutors 
today than we ever have. More agents today than we ever have. We have a 
greater caseload today than we ever have.”31 The aggressive enforcement 
of the FCPA has spanned the administrations of both George W. Bush and 
Barack Obama;32 absent legislative or judicial intervention, it appears to 
be a permanent part of the business law landscape. 
                                                                                                                         
26 See id. at 353–54 (“Because the monitor is independent, actively reviews the com-
pany’s practices, and reports to the government, the monitor might discover and reveal 
previously undisclosed wrongdoing. Any such wrongdoing may or may not be FCPA 
related, but if found by a monitor, it can lead to further scrutiny by the government and 
additional penalties.”). 
27 See id. at 371–72 (noting the importance of negotiating a budget with the monitor 
“to prevent the engagement from becoming the proverbial ‘gravy train.’”). 
28 See generally Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and 
Acquisition Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 
247, 247–53 (2010) (collecting enforcement actions); see also The Accomplishments of 
the U.S. Department of Justice 2001–2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 31 (2009), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/doj-accomplishments.pdf (“[T]he Department 
brought more FCPA prosecutions in [2005–2009] than in all of the previous 26 years dating 
back to passage of the FCPA statute in 1977.”). 
29 Accomplishments Under the Leadership of Attorney General Eric Holder, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/accomplishments/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) 
(“Since 2009, the Department has entered into more than 50 corporate resolutions, includ-
ing nine of the 10 largest resolutions ever in terms of penalties, resulting in approximately 
$2.63 billion in monetary penalties.”). 
30 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
June 14, 2011 Hearing], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers 
/112th/112-47_66886.PDF. 
31 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2013 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE (Gibson, Dunn & 
Dunn & Crutcher LLP Publications, Wash. D.C.), July 8, 2013, at 20, available at http:// 
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.pdf (citing 
Charles Duross, Remarks at the 27th Annual Nat’l Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 7, 
2013)). 
32 See Shearman & Sterling LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2–6 (Shearman & Sterling 
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With the frequency of enforcement increasing so dramatically, one 
might expect FCPA case law to develop at a parallel pace. That has not 
happened. As noted above, the devastating consequences of FCPA viola-
tions have led many corporate targets to resolve potential liability out of 
court.33 Companies “commonly prefer to pay huge penalties through de-
ferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements 
(NPAs) rather than actually litigate the dispute under the public eye.”34 
Even the co-director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement has ac-
knowledged that the frequency of these settlements has resulted in a dearth 
of precedent interpreting the FCPA.35 This lack of precedent, in turn, results 
in corporate conduct being preemptively shaped as much by the enforce-
ment positions of the DOJ and SEC as by legislation, regulation, or judicial 
decisions.36 In an attempt to read the prosecutorial tea leaves, companies 
often look to past enforcement actions of the DOJ and SEC. As a repre-
sentative for criminal defense attorneys described it in her 2011 testimony 
to the House of Representatives, “[b]ecause there has been so little judicial 
scrutiny of FCPA enforcement theories, right now the FCPA essentially 
means whatever the DOJ and SEC says it means.”37 
                                                                                                                         
LLP, N.Y.C., N.Y., 2014), available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services 
/FCPA/2014/FCPADigestTPFCPA010614.pdf. 
33 See Weissmann Testimony, supra note 24, at 3 n.8. 
34 R. Zachary Torres-Fowler, Undermining ICSID: How the Global Antibribery Regime 
Impairs Investor-State Arbitration, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 995, 1007 (2012). 
35 See Andrew Ceresney, Co-Director of the Division of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Keynote Address at the International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech 
/1370540392284#.UpJ61MSsim4 (“[C]ases against individuals have also fleshed out some 
important areas of FCPA law, which—as many of you know—is not well developed.”). 
36  See Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and Over-
Federalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 18 (2013) [hereinafter Terwilliger Testimony] (statement of 
fmr. Deputy Att’y Gen. George J. Terwilliger, III), available at http://judiciary.house.gov 
/_cache/files/e886416b-82d6-43f9-8d5d-68c44fc590cd/113-44-81464.pdf (“[B]ecause the 
FCPA is largely enforced exclusively by the Department of Justice and Securities Exchange 
Commission, beyond the scrutiny of judicial oversight, enforcement is dependent largely on 
prosecutorial discretion ....”); June 14, 2011 Hearing, supra note 30, at 2 (“The result is a 
shortage of court decisions determining the limits of the law. Companies must then analyze 
cases prosecuted by the Justice Department and the settlements reached to determine how 
to do business in foreign markets.”). 
37 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 46 (2011) (testimony of 
Shana-Tara Regon, Dir. While Collar Crime Policy, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.pdf; 
Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 909–10 (2010). 
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Unlike virtually every other federal criminal statute, however, the FCPA 
contains a mechanism through which U.S. companies and individuals may 
seek advisory opinions from the DOJ—the Opinion Procedure. 38  The 
Opinion Procedure allows companies to disclose prospective conduct to the 
DOJ.39 Upon receipt of all relevant facts regarding the prospective conduct, 
the DOJ issues a publicly available release opining as to whether the pro-
spective conduct would violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.40 
Although Opinion Procedure releases are not binding on the DOJ with re-
spect to anyone other than the requestor, they have become an additional 
source of guidance for companies.41 As a matter of discretion, the SEC also 
honors the DOJ’s Opinion Procedure releases.42 Unfortunately, the Opinion 
Procedure has been used infrequently.43 
Given the limited use of the Opinion Procedure and the lack of judicial 
precedent, the private bar44 and the industry45 have testified to Congress that 
the FCPA should be reformed to clarify its ambiguities. Perhaps in an at-
tempt to forestall legislative changes, the DOJ and SEC released a 120-page 
Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in November 
2012 (the “Resource Guide”).46 The Resource Guide describes itself as “an 
unprecedented undertaking by DOJ and SEC to provide the public with de-
tailed information about our FCPA enforcement approach and priorities.”47 
                                                                                                                         
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 78dd-2(e) (2012); 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.1–80.16 (2013). 
39 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 86. 
40 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2013). 
41 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 87 (“In order to provide non-binding guidance to the 
business community, DOJ makes versions of its opinions publicly available on its website.”). 
42 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 119 n.398. 
43 In the thirty-four years since the first release under the Review Procedure (a prede-
cessor to the Opinion Procedure), the DOJ has issued only sixty-one releases—less than 
one every six months. Even in the last decade of vigorous FCPA enforcement, the DOJ 
has issued only twenty-two releases. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV., Review 
Procedure Releases, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2014); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV., Opinion Procedure Releases, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
44 See Terwilliger Testimony, supra note 36, at 18–19. 
45 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 20 (2011) 
[hereinafter Mukasey Testimony] (testimony of fmr. Att’y Gen. Michael B. Mukasey), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.PDF; 
Andrew Weissmann and Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 11 (Oct. 
2010), http://openairblog.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/us-chamber-of-comm-amending-the 
-fcpa.pdf; Weissmann Testimony, supra note 24, at 4. 
46 See generally Resource Guide, supra note 1. 
47 Id. (foreword by Lanny A. Breuer and Robert S. Khuzami). 
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It “addresses a wide variety of topics, including ... what constitute[s] proper 
and improper gifts, travel and entertainment expenses ... how successor 
liability applies in the mergers and acquisitions context ... and the different 
types of civil and criminal resolutions available in the FCPA context.”48 
The business community has responded with guarded appreciation, while 
continuing to press for additional clarification on the enforcement posi-
tions of the DOJ and SEC with respect to issues such as corporate criminal 
liability, parent-subsidiary liability, and successor liability.49 
C. Mergers, Acquisitions, and the FCPA 
In a 2003 Opinion Procedure release, the DOJ first suggested that an 
acquiring company could be liable for the pre-acquisition FCPA violations 
of the acquired company.50 Subsequent cases confirmed the DOJ and SEC’s 
willingness to bring FCPA enforcement actions against buyers predicated 
on the pre-acquisition conduct of targets.51 
For example, in the $900 million merger between a subsidiary of General 
Electric Company (GE) and InVision Technologies Inc. (InVision), an in-
ternal investigation during due diligence revealed potential violations of the 
FCPA.52 The conduct was self-disclosed to the DOJ and SEC, which even-
tually settled with InVision for $800,000 and $500,000, respectively.53 The 
DOJ also required InVision to retain a compliance monitor.54 Moreover, 
although the DOJ did not charge GE, it required GE to enter into an NPA, 
pursuant to which GE agreed to continue InVision as “a separate legal en-
tity subject to investigation and prosecution” for the duration of InVision’s 
obligations to the DOJ.55 Notably, the DOJ stated that “in consideration” 
for GE’s cooperation, incorporation of the merged InVision subsidiary into 
GE’s compliance program, and other consideration, the DOJ would “not 
                                                                                                                         
48 Id. 
49 See Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Hon. Lanny A. Breuer and George 
S. Canellos 1, 3–5 (Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://www.ethic-intelligence.com images 
/documents/legislation_reference_texts/2013_Coalition_Letter_to_DOJ_and_SEC_re_Guid 
ance.pdf (regarding FCPA Resource Guide). 
50  U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION 
PROCEDURE RELEASE 03-01 (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal 
/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2003/0301.pdf. 
51 See generally Grimm, supra note 28, at 305–22 (collecting cases). 
52 Id. at 309. 
53 Id. at 310–11. 
54 Id. at 310. 
55 Non-Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 2, In re InVision Techs., (Dec. 3, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invision 
tech-agree-ge.pdf. 
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prosecute GE or any successor or subsidiary ... under the FCPA.”56 Of 
course, this strongly implies that, but for the NPA, the DOJ could have 
filed charges against GE. 
Another frequently cited example of FCPA liability following an ac-
quisition is the purchase of Latin Node, Inc. (Latin Node) by eLandia 
International, Inc. (eLandia).57 In 2007, eLandia acquired Latin Node 
through a stock purchase with Latin Node’s parent.58 After the transaction 
closed, eLandia quickly discovered and disclosed potentially corrupt pay-
ments made by Latin Node to government officials before the acquisition.59 
Notwithstanding the intervening acquisition and eLandia’s cooperation, 
however, the DOJ required eLandia’s new subsidiary to plead guilty to 
violating the FCPA.60 In exchange for Latin Node’s guilty plea, the DOJ 
agreed not to file “additional criminal charges against Defendant ... or its 
parent corporation ... eLandia International, Inc.”61 eLandia also agreed to 
provide the funds necessary to pay Latin Node’s fine.62 On a practical level, 
the FCPA liabilities caused eLandia to write off its investment and discon-
tinue Latin Node’s operations.63 
Finally, in a matter that predated the Resource Guide, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Watts Water Technologies, Inc. (Watts Water) acquired the 
business of Changsha Valve, a Chinese company, through an asset pur-
chase.64 Prior to the acquisition, Changsha Valve purportedly maintained a 
“sales incentive policy,” pursuant to which it allegedly made improper 
payments to employees of Chinese instrumentalities.65 The subsidiary of 
Watts Water allegedly continued these practices after acquiring the assets 
of Changsha Valve.66 
After Watts Water discovered and self-disclosed the potential FCPA 
violations, the SEC brought an enforcement action against Watts Water for 
its post-acquisition conduct, but not for the pre-acquisition conduct.67 The 
                                                                                                                         
56 Id. 
57 Information at 10–11, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 1:09-cr-20239-PCH, 
2009 WL 1423436 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2009). 
58 eLandia International, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 12–13 (Aug. 20, 2007). 
59 Information, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., supra note 57, at 2–3. 
60 Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 1:09-cr-20239-PCH (S.D. 
Fla. Apr. 3, 2009). 
61 Id. at 4. 
62 Id. at 3. 
63 eLandia International, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22–23 (Apr. 1, 2009). 
64 See Watts Water Tech., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 18 (Nov. 7, 2011). 
65 In re Watts Water Tech., Inc. and Leesen Chang, SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-
14585, 2, 4 (Oct. 13, 2011). 
66 Id. at 3–4. 
67 Id. at 7. 
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DOJ apparently declined to bring any enforcement action.68 There is no 
evidence that Changsha Valve was subject to the FCPA, however, and thus 
its pre-acquisition conduct could not give rise to liability, regardless of the 
acquisition structure.69 
After Watts Water self-disclosed the potential violations, however, it 
agreed to sell its subsidiary that owned the Changsha Valve assets to an-
other company. That company then sold the Changsha Valve assets to 
China Valves Technology, Inc. (China Valves).70 The SEC subsequently 
sent a letter with the following request to China Valves: 
You have indicated that there is no agreement with [Watts Water] regard-
ing the investigation into possible improper payments to foreign gov-
ernment officials by employees of Changsha Valve. Therefore, please 
confirm and revise your future filings, beginning with your Form 10-Q 
for the period ended June 30, 2011, to indicate, if true, that you have 
assumed full responsibility for any potential liabilities that may arise as 
a result of this matter.71 
On its face, the SEC’s letter would seem to indicate that the SEC asked 
China Valves to confirm that it would have successor liability in connection 
with the Changsha Valve transaction—indeed, that is what China Valves 
confirmed.72 On September 29, 2014, however, the SEC filed a complaint 
against China Valves based in part on its failure to disclose that the inter-
mediate entity in the transaction with Watt Water was merely a “straw 
man” created by China Valves to disguise the transaction.73 
In light of some of these cases, the call to reform the FCPA identified 
successor liability as an issue of paramount concern. For example, in former 
Attorney General Michael Mukasey’s congressional testimony, he stated that 
                                                                                                                         
68 Id. at 7–8. 
69 See Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28 (“Successor liability does not, however, 
create liability where none existed before. For example, if an issuer were to acquire a 
foreign company that was not previously subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, the mere 
acquisition of that foreign company would not retroactively create FCPA liability for the 
acquiring issuer.”). 
70 In re China Valves Tech. Sec. Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15017, at *5–6 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013). 
71 Letter from Rufus Decker, SEC Div. of Corporate Fin. Accounting Branch Chief, 
to Jianbao Wang, Chief Exec. Officer of China Valves Tech, Inc. (June 22, 2011) (on file 
with SEC) (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/108 
0360/000000000011038326/filename1.pdf. 
72 China Valves responded that it would “have successor liability to assume full re-
sponsibility for any potential liabilities.” Letter from Jianbao Wang, Chief Exec. Officer of 
China Valves Tech. Inc., to Rufus Decker, SEC Div. of Corporate Fin. Accounting Branch 
Chief (July 12, 2011) (on file with SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar 
/data/1080360/000120445911001877/filename1.htm. 
73 Complaint, SEC v. China Valves Tech., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01630 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2014). 
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criminal successor liability under the FCPA “is at odds with the basic prin-
ciples and goals of criminal law, including punishing only culpable conduct 
or deterring offending behavior.”74  Given this conflict, former Deputy 
Attorney General George Terwilliger proposed to Congress a “repose of 
post-acquisition due diligence,” pursuant to which an acquirer could inves-
tigate and disclose to the government any pre-acquisition violations, in ex-
change for immunity from penalty.75 Andrew Weissmann, a former DOJ 
prosecutor testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,76 noted 
some of the issues touched upon in this Article (including the intersection of 
federal and state successor liability law) before requesting that Congress 
place “clear parameters for ... successor liability under the FCPA ....”77 
As noted above, the Resource Guide appears to have been promulgated 
in response to pressures from the private bar and industry to clarify the 
government’s enforcement positions.78 With respect to successor liability, 
the Resource Guide states generally that “just as with any other statute, DOJ 
and SEC look to principles of ... successor liability in evaluating corporate 
liability.”79 Curiously, however, the Resource Guide continues to opine that 
“[a]s a general legal matter, when a company ... acquires another company, 
the successor company assumes the predecessor company’s liabilities.”80 
As discussed in the next section of this Article, the default rule for asset 
purchases is successor nonliability.81 Thus, the Resource Guide’s lack of 
specificity regarding asset purchases may leave its readers with the misim-
pression that any acquisition structure necessarily results in the assumption 
of FCPA liabilities by the acquiring company. 
                                                                                                                         
74 See Mukasey Testimony, supra note 45, at 30. 
75 See Terwilliger Testimony, supra note 36, at 19. 
76 See Andrew Weissmann Appointed as FBI’s General Counsel, FBI (Oct. 26, 2011), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/andrew-weissmann-appointed 
-as-fbis-general-counsel (announcing Weissmann’s appointment to be the General Counsel to 
the FBI, which investigates potential FCPA violations). 
77 Weissmann Testimony, supra note 24, at 12. 
78 See generally Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the 26th 
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Nov. 8, 
2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108 
.html (discussing lobbying efforts of U.S. Chamber of Commerce and others, and noting 
that “in 2012, in what I hope will be a useful and transparent aid, we expect to release 
detailed new guidance on the Act’s criminal and civil enforcement provisions”). 
79 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 27; see also Philip Urofsky, Hee Won (Marina) 
Moon & Jennifer Rimm, The Fallacies of Reform, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1175 (2012) 
(“[T]he government, applying traditional liability theories, has taken the position that a 
mere change in ownership does not extinguish liability.”). 
80 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28. 
81 George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 FLA. ST. 
U. BUS. REV. 9, 11 (2007); see infra Part II. 
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II. SUCCESSOR NONLIABILITY AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
The text of the FCPA does not provide for successor liability, which 
means that if it is to apply, the doctrine must be derived from elsewhere. 
As discussed below, federal common law is the most likely vector for the 
application of successor liability doctrines. But before addressing how suc-
cessor liability may apply through the federal common law, it is important 
to review what successor liability is and what it is not. 
A. Traditional Common Law of the States 
Pursuant to the laws of virtually every U.S. jurisdiction, a company that 
acquires the assets of another generally does not assume the liabilities.82 
The policy rationales for the rule of nonliability are straightforward. First, 
the nonliability rule appeals to fundamental notions of fairness: “[n]o per-
son should be bound by contractual obligations that they have not volun-
tarily assumed. Similarly, no person should be liable for torts they did not 
commit.”83 Second, a rule of nonliability increases certainty in the market-
place and recognizes the importance of the free alienability of property; in 
contrast, a broad rule of successor liability would have a “chilling effect on 
potential purchasers who might acquire the assets of a foreclosed business 
and find themselves liable for debts they never intended to assume.”84 
Notwithstanding the general rule of successor nonliability, courts tra-
ditionally have recognized exceptions when: 
x the acquirer expressly or impliedly assumes the liability; 
x the transaction is an attempt to fraudulently evade liability; 
x the acquiring company’s business constitutes a “mere con-
tinuation” of the seller’s business; or 
x the transaction amounts to a de facto merger.85 
                                                                                                                         
82  WILLIAM M. FLETCHER ET. AL, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 7122, (rev. vol. 2008); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Ultimate Independence 
of the Federal Courts: Defying the Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal Common 
Law Powers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 425, 463 (2004) (“This rule of non-liability for asset 
acquisitions arose out of the bona fide purchaser rule, and was designed to promote the 
free alienability of property and to enhance the efficiency of commercial transactions.” 
(citation omitted)). 
83 John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 381 (2011). 
84 Glentel, Inc. v. Wireless Ventures, LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (N.D. Ind. 2005) 
(citation omitted). 
85 Matheson, supra note 83, at 383; see, e.g., Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 
337 Fed. App’x 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Kentucky law of successor nonliability 
and noting that it recognized these four exceptions); Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, 
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One scholar has noted that all of the traditional exceptions (other than 
assumption of liability) are simply different iterations of the same concern: 
that a company’s owners will use manipulations of the corporate form to 
defraud creditors.86 For clarity, however, all four exceptions are discussed 
briefly below. 
The first “exception”—express or implied assumption of liabilities—
simply restates hornbook contract principles and thus is not an exception 
at all.87 When an asset purchase agreement provides that the purchaser will 
assume certain liabilities, the purchaser naturally will be responsible for 
those liabilities.88 Relatedly, “[c]ourts generally find purchasers have im-
pliedly assumed liabilities when ‘the conduct or representations relied 
upon ... evidence an intention on the part of the purchasing company to 
assume the old corporation’s liabilities in whole or in part.’”89 For either 
branch of this “exception” to apply, however, the purchaser must intend to 
assume the liabilities. 
The second exception, fraud, is also straightforward. When a company 
fraudulently transfers its assets to avoid its creditors, courts will ignore the 
transaction and hold the successor liable for the company’s debts.90 For 
the fraud exception to apply, typically the defendants must have deceived 
the plaintiff.91 
The “mere continuation” and “de facto merger” exceptions are closely 
related.92 Although the formulations vary slightly by jurisdiction, they 
                                                                                                                         
294 F.3d 640, 649 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that Florida follows general rule of successor 
nonliability, but “recognizes all four of the traditionally-accepted exceptions”); Eagle Pac. 
Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) 
(noting that though “[t]he general rule in Washington is that a corporation purchasing the 
assets of another is not liable for the seller’s debts,” these four exceptions apply). 
86 See Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 
769 (2003) (“[T]he list of traditional factors for a finding of de facto merger or mere 
continuation describes a transfer and a transferee that have no purpose but to defraud 
creditors.”) (citation omitted). 
87 Matheson, supra note 83, at 384. 
88 FLETCHER, supra note 82. 
89 Matheson, supra note 83, at 386. 
90 Id. at 384. 
91 See, e.g., Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry Co., 215 F.3d 182, 192 (1st Cir. 
2000) (“We have found no evidence of misrepresentation or deceit by the defendants that 
either induced [their creditor] to act contrary to his best interests or fail to take action that 
could have resulted in the payment of all or a part of the commissions due.”). 
92 Greenway Ctr., Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co., 369 Fed. App’x 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(noting that “courts treat de facto merger and [mere] continuation identically”); Douglas 
v. Stamco, 363 Fed. App’x 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he de facto merger and mere 
continuation exceptions ... are often regarded as so similar as to be considered a single 
exception.”) (citation omitted). 
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typically involve elements or factors similar to the following: (1) continuity 
of shareholders and ownership, management, personnel, physical location, 
and business operations; (2) whether sufficient consideration was given, par-
ticularly whether stock was given in exchange; (3) whether the predecessor 
ceased business operations and was dissolved shortly after the new com-
pany was formed; (4) whether the successor company paid any outstanding 
debts on behalf of the previous company in order to continue business with-
out interruption; (5) the buyer’s intent or purpose when the new company 
was formed; and (6) whether the successor held itself out to the public as a 
continuation of the previous company.93 
These exceptions “embod[y] a policy that corporations should not be able 
to avoid liability by simply changing their form or name.”94 In short, the 
mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions effectively allow a creditor 
to rely on objective indicators of fraudulent intent to avoid liability, rather 
than being forced to prove such intent pursuant to the fraud exception.95 
Critically, however, both exceptions generally require continuity of owner-
ship between the seller and the purchaser.96 
                                                                                                                         
93 Dixstar v. GenTec Equip., No. 3:02CV-45-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7201, at *12 
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 11, 2004) (accord. Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 337 Fed. 
App’x 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2009)) (collecting cases). 
94 Matheson, supra note 83, at 392. This, of course, is the policy in the context of tort 
and contract liabilities. The de facto merger doctrine originated not as a means to secure com-
pensation for injured third parties, but to protect dissenting shareholders’ rights when con-
trolling shareholders would attempt to effect a merger without the dissenters’ approvals. 
See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., 182 A.2d 22, 24–25 (Del. Ch. 1962). 
95 See Reilly, supra note 86, at 769; see also Ed Peters Jewelry Co., 215 F.3d at 190 
(calling the mere continuation exception “circumstantial”). Also note that the mere contin-
uation and de facto merger exceptions arguably are not subject to the particularity require-
ment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that is applicable to the fraud exception. See 
Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 86, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that 
fraud exception argument would fail on 9(b) grounds, but not applying 9(b) to de facto 
merger exception analysis). 
96 See C.T. Charlton & Assocs. v. Thule, Inc., 541 Fed. App’x 549, 554 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“Under the ‘mere continuity’ exception, courts will look to the totality of the circum-
stances but only if the ‘indispensable’ requirements of common ownership and a transfer of 
substantially all assets are met first.”) (citation omitted); Cargo Partner, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 
104 (“[M]y research discloses no case (in New York or other jurisdictions) in which a 
court has found a de facto merger without at least some degree of ownership continuity—
except in the area of products liability (and the other tort areas mentioned ... below) where 
some courts have justified new or expanded exceptions on special policy grounds.”); see 
also Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, 294 F.3d 640, 650 (5th Cir. 2002) (“In other 
words, a ‘mere continuation of business’ will be found where the purchasing corporation is 
merely a ‘new hat’ for the seller with the same or similar management and ownership.”); 
Weaver v. Nash Int’l, Inc., 730 F.2d 547, 548 (8th Cir. 1984) (declining to find successor 
liability without unity of ownership). 
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B. The Substantial Continuity Exception 
In addition to the four traditional exceptions, however, some courts have 
recognized other exceptions to the general rule of successor nonliability. 
In particular, a few courts have recognized a “substantial continuity” excep-
tion, sometimes referred to as the “continuity of enterprise” exception. The 
exception is often traced to Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., a Michigan 
products liability case.97 In Turner, the Michigan Supreme Court jettisoned 
the traditional requirement of continuity of ownership from the mere con-
tinuation exception, and held that the elements were simply: 
(1) [B]asic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, includ-
ing, apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general business 
operations, and even the [seller’s] name. 
(2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liqui-
dated, and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration received 
from the buying corporation. 
(3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and obliga-
tions of the seller ordinarily necessary or the continuation of the normal 
business operations of the seller corporation. 
(4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effec-
tive continuation of the seller corporation.98 
Thus, in contrast to the mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions, 
“commonality of ownership is not required.”99 “[W]hereas the mere contin-
uation test asks whether there is a continuation of the corporate entity of the 
seller, the continuity of enterprise test sets a lower standard ... by focusing on 
whether there was a continuation of the seller’s business operations.”100 
Perhaps cognizant of the criticism that the expansive exception would 
likely receive, the Turner court took pains to limit its decision to the prod-
ucts liability context.101 And, upon revisiting the substantial continuity 
                                                                                                                         
97 244 N.W.2d 873, 881–82 (Mich. 1976). 
98 Id. at 883–84 (emphasis added). 
99 Einhorn v. ML Ruberton Const. Co., 632 F. 3d 89, 99 (3d Cir. 2011). 
100 Matheson, supra note 83, at 396. 
101 Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877–78, 884 (“This is a products liability case first and 
foremost .... [The general rule of nonliability] developed not in response to products lia-
bility problems .... The above-listed evidence makes out a prima facie case of continu-
ation of corporate responsibility for products liability.”). For criticism of the substantial 
continuity test, see, e.g., Reilly, supra note 86, at 789 (“Courts who have imposed suc-
cessor liability under one of the continuity-based theories described above have not satis-
factorily explained why, in a particular case, the interest of the plaintiff creditor should 
prevail over that of the transferee.”); FLETCHER, supra note 82, at § 7123.06; see also 
Glentel, Inc. v. Wireless Ventures, LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (N.D. Ind. 2005); 
Gallenberg Equip., Inc. v. Agromac Int’l, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1055 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
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exception for the first time in more than two decades, the Michigan Supreme 
Court limited its holding again, concluding that when the “predecessor [is] 
available for recourse ... the continuity of enterprise theory of successor 
liability is inapplicable.”102 Subsequent formulations by federal courts have 
added an additional requirement: that the acquirer knows of the liability 
prior to the acquisition.103 
Even with these limitations, however, the exception has not gained wide-
spread acceptance at the state level.104 Additionally, even those courts that 
have adopted the substantial continuity exception have recognized that its pri-
mary policy rationale is to facilitate compensation for innocent victims—a re-
medial purpose not present in the punitive context of FCPA enforcement.105 
                                                                                                                         
102 Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Mich. 1999). 
103 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fisher v. Network Software Assocs., Inc., 180 F. 
Supp. 2d 192, 195 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 747–48 
(7th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that there are two prongs to successor liability under 
the substantial continuity exception: “The first is that the successor had notice of the claim 
before the acquisition.... The second condition is that there be substantial continuity in the 
operation of the business before and after the sale ....”). Like Michigan, some circuits also 
require that the seller be unable to provide adequate relief. See, e.g., Einhorn, 632 F. 3d at 
95. As noted infra, the federal substantial continuity exception may not have the same 
origins as the state law exception of the same name, although that has not stopped some 
federal courts from citing Turner’s formulation of the exception. See infra note 169. 
104 See Lea J. Heffernan, Application of the Remedial Purpose Canon to CERCLA 
Successor Liability Issues after United States v. Bestfoods: Why State Corporate Law 
Should Be Applied in Circuits Encompassing Substantial Continuity Exception States, 30 
N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 387, 401 (2010) (“Five of the fifty states have expanded the tradi-
tional ‘mere continuation’ exception in order to focus on continuity of business or enter-
prise, rather than continuity of the predecessor corporation”); see, e.g., Tabor v. Metal 
Ware Corp., 168 P.3d 814, 817 (Utah 2007) (“We decline to adopt ... the continuity of 
enterprise exception because we believe that the four exceptions to the traditional rule 
provide adequate protection to consumers. We note that if the legislature believes the ex-
isting exceptions inadequately protect consumers, it may wish to create additional statu-
tory protections.”); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 519 (S.D. 
1986) (“[W]e are not persuaded to follow Turner in this case where none of the owners, 
officers or stockholders were the same ....”); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 
820, 829 (Wis. 1985) (“We decline to adopt the ‘expanded continuation’ exception to 
nonliability ....”). Delaware, often considered to be at the vanguard of corporate law, has 
not recognized the substantial continuity exception. See Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 
698 F. Supp. 535, 540–42 (D. Del. 1988) (noting that Delaware recognizes the four tradi-
tional exceptions and that, for mere continuation, it requires continuity of the same corpo-
rate entity); Stayton v. Clariant Corp., No. K05C-05-042, 2013 Del. Super. LEXIS 466, 
at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2013) (stating that Delaware recognizes the four tradi-
tional exceptions to successor nonliability). 
105 See Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 511 (“The underlying rationale for the Turner Court’s 
decision to disregard traditional corporate law principles was to provide a source of re-
covery for injured plaintiffs.”). 
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Notwithstanding the fact that very few states have adopted the substan-
tial continuity exception—and that even Michigan has limited it to cases in-
volving products liability and employment discrimination106—federal courts 
have adopted the substantial continuity exception in other discrete federal law 
contexts. Courts have frequently discussed the exception in federal labor 
and employment disputes and suits arising under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),107 though 
the vitality of its application to CERCLA suits is doubtful.108 No court has 
considered whether it applies to actions under the FCPA, however.109 
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND CIVIL SUCCESSOR 
LIABILITY UNDER THE FCPA 
The text of the FCPA does not specifically provide for successor lia-
bility.110 Therefore, either successor liability is unavailable because Congress 
did not provide for it in the statute, or some variety of common law addresses 
the congressional omission. The introduction to any discussion of federal 
common law is obliged to invoke Justice Brandeis’s famous statement in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: “There is no federal general common law.”111 If 
                                                                                                                         
106 See C.T. Charlton & Assocs. v. Thule, Inc., No. 12-2619, 541 Fed. App’x 549, 552 
(6th Cir. 2013). 
107 See Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 764 (7th Cir. 
2013) (“[W]hen liability is based on a violation of a federal statute relating to labor rela-
tions or employment, a federal common law standard of successor liability is applied that 
is more favorable to plaintiffs than most state-law standards to which the court might 
otherwise look.”); New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indust., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(noting circuit split on successor liability test for CERCLA). 
108 See generally infra Part III; see, e.g., Nat’l Serv. Indust., Inc., 460 F.3d at 215 
(abandoning its precedent which had applied substantial continuity exception to CERCLA 
claims). 
109 Grimm, supra note 28, at 281. 
110 Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452–53 (2002) (“Where Congress 
wanted to provide for successor liability in the Coal Act, it did so explicitly, as demonstrated 
by other sections in the Act that give the option of attaching liability to ‘successors’ and 
‘successors in interest.’”). 
111 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Authors have noted that there is no good definition of federal 
common law. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common 
Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 589 (2006) (“The Supreme Court has been unsuccessful in 
offering either an inclusive definition or a theory of federal common law. Indeed it has 
never really tried.”). For the purposes of this Article, I use “federal common law” as the 
Court used it in the Atherton v. FDIC: “a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an 
interpretation of a federal statute or a properly promulgated administrative rule, but rather 
to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal rule of decision.” 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) 
(citation omitted). 
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that maxim held true in every case, the omission of successor liability from 
the text of the FCPA would be dispositive of the issue.112 
A well-known line of post-Erie cases, usually traced to Clearfield Trust 
Co. v. United States,113 has demonstrated that federal courts can, and do, 
develop federal common law in certain circumstances. There are two stages 
to determining whether and how federal courts should apply federal com-
mon law.114 First, does the court have the authority to create federal com-
mon law?115 Second, assuming the court has the authority to create federal 
common law, how should it exercise its discretion to do so?116 
A. Do Federal Courts Have the Authority to Create a Common Law of 
Successor Liability Under the FCPA? 
Federal courts may fashion rules of decision when they are granted 
express or implied authority to do so by the Constitution, treaties, or Con-
gress,117 or when the cases fall within narrow enclaves defined by the 
Supreme Court.118 
                                                                                                                         
112 Arguably, when a law makes no mention of successor liability, common law is neces-
sary to fill not one, but two separate gaps. For statutes that include a reference to “successors” 
as potentially liable parties, common law may be necessary to give content to the term. 
See, e.g., Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(citation omitted) (“Under [the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)], ‘employer’ is defined to include a ‘successor in interest’ 
to a plaintiff’s previous employer .... USERRA does not, however, define ‘successor in 
interest.’”); Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 780 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) imposes liability on “successors in in-
terest,” but “[t]he FMLA does not define the term ‘successor in interest.’”). This may be 
closer to traditional statutory interpretation than true federal common law, however. 
For laws that do not even include a reference to “successors,” resorting to common law 
is necessary not merely to give content to a statutory term, but also to provide the entire 
theory of liability. For example, CERCLA imposes liability only on “persons,” a term 
which is defined to include corporations, but which does not explicitly include corporate 
successors. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)–(21) (2012). Nonetheless, as discussed in more detail 
later, the circuits have applied federal common law to provide the theory of successor lia-
bility in CERCLA cases (although they have disagreed at times on the test for successor 
liability). See infra notes 152–54. Accordingly, this Article assumes that a court could 
apply common law not only to define the contours of successor liability under the FCPA, 
but also to provide the theory of liability itself, notwithstanding the fact that the FCPA 
does not explicitly include “successors” in its text. 
113 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
114 See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 111, at 647. 
115 Id. 
116 Id.  
117 Accord Texas Indust., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642–43 (1981); 
see, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012); Textile Workers 
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450–51 (1957). 
118 See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 111, at 593. 
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The FCPA contains no express grant of authority to develop federal 
common law, and the mere “vesting of jurisdiction ... does not in and of it-
self give rise to authority to formulate federal common law ... nor does the 
existence of congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal courts 
are free to develop a common law to govern those areas until Congress 
acts.”119 Authority to develop a federal common law of successor liability 
also is not impliedly granted because there is no support in the legislative 
history for such a grant.120 
In addition to constitutional and congressional grants of authority, the 
Supreme Court has recognized “enclaves” of federal common law in which 
the federal courts may establish a federal rule of decision.121 Although these 
enclaves are “few and restricted,”122 they include cases involving “the rights 
and obligations of the United States,”123 government contractor liability,124 
“interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of 
States or our relations with foreign nations,”125 admiralty,126 and claim 
                                                                                                                         
119 Texas Indust., Inc., 451 U.S. at 640–41 (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere 
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)). 
120 Congress and the President intended the 1998 amendments to the FCPA to bring 
the United States into compliance with its treaty obligations under the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the “OECD Convention”). See 
Comm. on Commerce, International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, H.R. 
Rep. No. 105-802, at 9 (1998); Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, International 
Ant-Bribery Act of 1998, S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 1 (1998); William J. Clinton, Statement 
on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 34 Weekly 
Comp. Pres. Doc. 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998). The OECD Convention required its signatories 
to enact laws prohibiting bribery of foreign government officials. See Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions pmbl., Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1, 4. Notably, however, the OECD Convention was silent on 
successor liability. See generally id. Accordingly, even assuming the reference to the 
OECD Convention in the legislative history of the 1998 amendments could be sufficient 
to allow a court to rely upon international law, it provides no illumination as to issues of 
successor liability. 
121 Some authors have expressed doubt about whether the “enclave” theory of federal 
common law is still viable. See, e.g., Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 111, at 614. Reconcil-
ing the theories of courts’ federal common law power is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
122 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). 
123 Texas Indust., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641 (1981) (citing United States v. Little Lake 
Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 
(1943)). 
124 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 500 (1987). 
125 Texas Indust., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641 (citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 
(1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Hinderlider v. La 
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)). 
126 Texas Indust., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641 (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979); Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963)). 
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preclusion for federal judgments in diversity cases.127 Cases brought under 
the FCPA arguably fit within either the enclave for suits involving “the 
rights and obligations of the United States” or the enclave for disputes 
implicating “our relations with foreign nations.”128 
B. What is the Content of the Federal Common Law? 
Assuming that a court has the power to fashion federal common law, 
there is still a question as to how the court should decide the content of that 
common law. As the Supreme Court has stated, “the existence of related 
federal statutes does not automatically show that Congress intended courts 
to dictate the content of federal common law rules, for ‘Congress acts ... 
against the background of the total corpus juris of the states ...’.”129 Poten-
tial sources for the content of the federal common law include: (1) the law 
of a particular state; (2) the law of the majority of states; or (3) analogy to 
similar federal common law decisions.130 
1. Kimbell Foods and Subsequent Supreme Court Cases 
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., the Supreme Court established 
a three-part test to determine when federal common law should displace 
state law: “(1) whether the federal program, by its very nature, required 
uniformity; (2) whether application of state law would frustrate specific 
objectives of the federal program; and (3) whether application of uniform 
federal law would disrupt existing commercial relations predicated on 
state law.”131 Applying this test, the Kimbell Foods court concluded that it 
should incorporate state law to decide whether contractual liens arising 
                                                                                                                         
127 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001). 
128 See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 929, 938 (2012) (tracing legislative history and stating, “[F]oreign policy was the 
primary policy concern from the discovered foreign corporate payments which motivated 
Congress to act. However, foreign policy was not the sole reason motivating Congress. 
The legislative record also evidences that congressional motivation was sparked by a post-
Watergate morality, economic perceptions, and global leadership.”). For the purposes of the 
Article, I assume that courts have the authority to develop a federal common law of suc-
cessor liability under the FCPA. 
129 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum 
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
130 See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of the General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
503, 533–34 (2006). There is a circuit split concerning CERCLA successor liability dis-
cussed later. See Griffith & Goutman, infra note 151. 
131 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979)). 
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from federal loan programs took precedence over private liens.132 A string 
of Supreme Court opinions in the 1990s elaborated on the Kimbell Foods 
test and strongly indicated that lower courts should be wary of displacing 
state law. 
In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held 
that in a derivative action under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
law governing any demand futility exception should be drawn from the law 
of the state of incorporation.133 After quickly concluding that federal com-
mon law applied, the Court stated: 
It does not follow, however, that the content of such a rule must be 
wholly the product of a federal court’s own devising. Our cases indicate 
that a court should endeavor to fill the interstices of federal remedial 
schemes with uniform federal rules only when the scheme in question 
evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards ... or when ex-
press provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional 
policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand ....134 
The Court also emphasized that “[t]he presumption that state law should be 
incorporated into federal common law is particularly strong in areas in which 
private parties have entered legal relationships with the expectation that 
their rights and obligations would be governed by state-law standards .... 
Corporation law is one such area.”135 
Three years later, in O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, the Court empha-
sized that the second Kimbell Foods factor—conflict between state and 
federal law—was a necessary condition for the application of federal com-
mon law.136 Indeed, the Court stated, “[o]ur cases uniformly require the ex-
istence of such a conflict as a precondition for recognition of a federal rule 
of decision.”137 The O’Melveny court also gave short shrift to uniformity 
concerns, calling them the “most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged 
federal interests.”138 
In Atherton v. FDIC, the Court reinforced its statement in O’Melveny 
that conflict is a “precondition” to federal law supplanting that of the 
states.139 Reading Atherton and O’Melveny together, the absence of a bona 
                                                                                                                         
132 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740. 
133 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991). 
134 Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 
366–67; Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988); DelCostello v. 
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169–72 (1983)). 
135 Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98 (citations omitted). 
136 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994). 
137 Id. at 87 (citation omitted). 
138 Id. at 88. 
139 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (citations omitted). 
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fide conflict between the state and federal jurisprudence means that a fed-
eral court should not apply federal common law merely because applica-
tion of state law risks inconsistent judgments.140 The Atherton court again 
derided “generalized pleas for uniformity,”141 stating that “[t]o invoke the 
concept of uniformity ... is not to prove its need.”142 
Finally, in 1998, the Court indicated that it would take a dim view of the 
creation of a federal common law of corporate liability.143 Specifically, in 
United States v. Bestfoods, the Court considered a parent company’s liability 
under CERCLA for its subsidiary’s operations.144 In addition to analyzing 
direct liability, the Court decided whether the parent could be held respon-
sible on the basis of the subsidiary’s conduct.145 Despite scholarly criticism 
of parent nonliability, the Bestfoods court wrote that “nothing in CERCLA 
purports to reject this bedrock principle, and against this venerable common-
law backdrop, the congressional silence is audible.”146 Importantly, the 
Court stated: 
CERCLA is thus like many another congressional enactment in giving 
no indication that “the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be re-
placed simply because a plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon a federal 
statute,” ... and the failure of the statute to speak to a matter as fundamental 
as the liability implications of corporate ownership demands application 
of the rule that “[i]n order to abrogate a common-law principle, the stat-
ute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law.”147 
The Court also recognized the disagreement over whether courts should 
borrow state law or instead create a federal common law of veil piercing, but 
it did not address the divergence because no party had raised the issue.148 
                                                                                                                         
140 Interestingly, the O’Melveny Court also wrote that “California law, not federal law, 
governs the imputation of knowledge to corporate victims of alleged negligence, and that is 
so whether or not California chooses to follow the majority rule.” O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 
84–85. The application of respondeat superior as a basis for corporate liability is one of the 
issues frequently cited by FCPA reformers. See, e.g., Mukasey Testimony, supra note 45, at 
19 (“A company can ... be held liable for violations committed by rogue employees, agents 
or subsidiaries even if the company has a state-of-the-art FCPA compliance program.”). 
An analysis of the choice of law for that issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
O’Melveny certainly points in the direction of state law. 
141 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979). 
142 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted). 
143 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 55. 
146 Id. at 62 (citation omitted). 
147 Id. at 63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 478 (1979) and United States v. 
Texas, 507 U. S. 529, 534 (1993), respectively). 
148 Id. at 63 n.9. Veil-piercing doctrines often are relevant in corporate FCPA enforce-
ment actions as well, but discussion of those doctrines is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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2. The Circuits’ Analyses of Successor Liability Under 
Federal Statutes 
In the aftermath of Kimbell Foods, the circuit courts have grappled 
with the federal common law of successor liability in matters as diverse as 
CERCLA, federal labor and employment laws, and the enforcement of 
patent infringement judgments.149 Although any analysis of civil successor 
liability under the FCPA requires an independent application of the Kimbell 
Foods test, the circuits’ analyses of successor liability in these other con-
texts is instructive. 
a. CERCLA 
CERCLA is “not a model of legislative draftsmanship,” yet it carries 
the potential for enormous liability.150 Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
litigants, courts, and commentators have fiercely debated the relevant law 
for successor liability in the context of CERCLA.151 Litigation over the 
federal common law of successor liability—and whether it includes the 
substantial continuity exception—led to a circuit split and significant 
scholarly commentary.152 
Prior to Bestfoods, “the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals held, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals assumed, and the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that federal courts should develop a 
uniform federal common law of successor liability for CERCLA.”153 In 
                                                                                                                         
149 Although it is not a circuit opinion, it is worth noting that the Western District of 
Washington recently recognized that the Kimbell Foods analysis is necessary to determine 
successor liability under the federal False Claims Act (FCA). See United States ex rel. 
Klein v. Omeros Corp., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (citations omitted) 
(incorporating state law and rejecting substantial continuity exception because “[plaintiff] 
makes no argument for why the four traditional [state-law] exceptions do not adequately 
protect the FCA’s goal of preventing fraud on the government, beyond generically asserting 
that ‘the FCA is designed to serve a broad, remedial interest in preventing fraud against 
the federal government’”). 
150 Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986). 
151 See Rodney B. Griffith & Thomas M. Goutman, A Hiccup in Federal Common Law 
Jurisprudence: Bestfoods and the Supreme Court’s Restraints on Development of Federal 
Rules of Corporate Liability, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 359, 394–95 (2006); Rosenberg, 
supra note 82; Matt Sieving, Rising Phoenix-like from the Ashes: An Argument for Expanded 
Corporate Successor Liability under CERCLA, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 427 (2008); Michael 
Carter, Comment, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: It’s Time to Fully Embrace State 
Law, 156 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 767 (2008). 
152  See Griffith & Goutman, supra note 151, at 394–95. 
153 Id. (citing B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 581–619 (2d Cir. 1996), over-
ruled by New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2003); United States 
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contrast, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits adopted state law to provide the 
framework for analyzing asset purchasers’ CERCLA liability.154 
Beginning in 1998, however, some courts reconsidered the creation and 
content of a federal common law of CERCLA successor liability.155 For 
example, the First Circuit, which addressed the issue for the first time only 
after Bestfoods, concluded that the state law of successor liability applied.156 
Furthermore, in United States v. General Battery Corp., the Third Circuit 
held that although federal common law still applied to successor liability 
under CERCLA after Bestfoods, the content of the common law was “‘the 
general doctrine of successor liability in operation in most states.’”157 Thus, 
because the general doctrine of successor liability in most states does not 
include the substantial continuity exception, the Third Circuit declined an in-
vitation to adopt it.158 Relatedly, in New York v. National Services Industries 
Inc., the Second Circuit overruled its pre-Bestfoods decision applying the 
substantial continuity exception, because the exception is not part of the gen-
eral federal common law.159 In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. 
v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., the Ninth Circuit also overruled its pre-Bestfoods 
decision applying the substantial continuity exception to CERCLA claims, 
because the substantial continuity exception is not the traditional rule in 
most states.160 Even the Eighth Circuit has acknowledged that the excep-
tion was cast in doubt by Bestfoods.161 
                                                                                                                         
v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837–38 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 486–87 (8th Cir. 1992); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. 
v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1262–64 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled by Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90–92 (3rd Cir. 1988)). In North Shore 
Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., the Seventh Circuit applied federal common law based upon the 
parties’ mutual use of it in their briefs, but it specifically reserved judgment as to the issue. 
152 F.3d 642, 650–51 (7th Cir. 1998). 
154 Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501–02 (11th Cir. 
1996) (applying state law to question of successor liability for a limited liability partnership); 
City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251–52 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying 
Michigan law and distinguishing Turner as limited to products liability cases). 
155 See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001). 
156 Davis, 261 F.3d at 53–54. 
157 423 F.3d at 298 (citing Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 
F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989)). 
158 Id. at 309. 
159  352 F.3d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 2003). Later in the same dispute, then-Judge 
Sotomayor suggested even more strongly that Kimbell Foods required incorporation of the 
state law of successor liability. See New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d 201, 208–09 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
160 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1998). 
161 K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1022 (8th Cir. 2007). The 
Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary to overrule its prior precedent in light of Bestfoods 
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Although these post-Bestfoods opinions used different reasoning, vir-
tually all of them led to the same result—the substantial continuity excep-
tion is inapplicable to CERCLA successor liability. Although observers 
have critiqued the variety of the circuits’ reasoning, they generally have 
agreed with the result.162 
b. Federal Labor and Employment Laws 
In several pre-Kimbell Foods cases, the Supreme Court adopted the 
substantial continuity exception (or an exception very similar to it) for 
successor liability under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act and the National Labor Relations Act.163 In so doing, the Supreme 
Court emphasized the potential for conflict with the express statutory pur-
pose of labor peace if expansive successor liability was not applicable.164 
Circuit courts have adopted this reasoning to apply the substantial continu-
ity exception to other federal labor and employment statutes including 
Title VII,165 ERISA,166 the Railway Labor Act,167 the Age Discrimination 
                                                                                                                         
because even assuming the substantial continuity exception was still viable, the plaintiff 
in K.C. 1986 could not establish successor liability. Id. at 1024–25. The Fourth Circuit 
has not directly addressed the substantial continuity exception in a CERCLA case after 
Bestfoods, though it has given the faintest indication that the exception may no longer be 
good law. See PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 173 (4th 
Cir. 2013). Under CERCLA, successor corporations may be liable for the actions of their 
predecessors. However, as at common law, a corporation that acquires the assets of another 
corporation typically does not acquire its liabilities, unless: “(1) the successor expressly 
or impliedly agrees to assume the liabilities of the predecessor; (2) the transaction may be 
considered a de facto merger; (3) the successor may be considered a ‘mere continuation’ 
of the predecessor; or (4) the transaction is fraudulent .... In the past, we have also rec-
ognized successor liability where ‘substantial continuity’ exists between a predecessor and 
successor corporation.” Id. (citations omitted). 
162 See Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 455–56 (“CERCLA’s silence regarding asset 
purchaser liability … should receive similar treatment to that given parent corporations in 
Bestfoods—Congress’ silence should be dispositive and federal courts should defer to 
state corporation law rules.” (citation omitted)); Carter, supra note 151. But see Sieving, 
supra note 151. 
163 See Howard Johnson Co., v. Hotel Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 259–64 (1974); Golden 
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184–85 (1973). 
164 See Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 259–64; Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. 
at 184–85. 
165 EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090–91 (6th Cir. 
1974). 
166  Einhorn v. ML Ruberton Const. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 96–100 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Upholsterers’ Int’l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture, 920 F.2d 1323, 1327–28 
(7th Cir. 1990). 
167 Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18, 26 (1st 
Cir. 2000). 
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in Employment Act,168 the Family and Medical Leave Act,169 and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.170 
In one of the most recent of these cases, Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power 
Solutions, L.L.C., Judge Posner went so far as to say that “successor liabil-
ity is appropriate in suits to enforce federal labor or employment laws—
even when the successor disclaimed liability when it acquired the assets in 
question—unless there are good reasons to withhold such liability.”171 
Arguably, this is an even stronger formulation of the federal law of suc-
cessor liability than the “traditional” substantial continuity exception.172 
One page later, however, Judge Posner cast doubt on the entire enterprise 
of federal common law successor liability: 
There are better arguments against having a federal standard for labor 
and employment cases, besides the general objections to multifactor 
tests that we noted earlier: applying a judge-made standard amounts to 
judicial amendment of the statutes to which it’s applied by adding a rem-
edy that Congress has not authorized; implied remedies (that is, reme-
dies added by judges to the remedies specified in statutes) have become 
disfavored; and borrowing state common law, especially a common law 
principle uniform across the states, to fill gaps in federal statutes is an 
attractive alternative to creating federal common law, an alternative the 
Supreme Court adopted for example in United States v. Bestfoods ... in 
regard to the liability of a corporation under the Superfund law for a 
subsidiary’s violations.173 
Unfortunately, the defendant in Teed failed to raise these “better argu-
ments,” and therefore the opinion did not further explore them.174 Given 
Judge Posner’s strong suggestion that such arguments may be successful, 
however, it is likely that subsequent labor and employment defendants will 
raise these arguments. As with CERCLA, courts may follow the sugges-
tion in Bestfoods and reject the use of common law to create successor 
                                                                                                                         
168  EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 747–48 (7th Cir. 1994). In G-K-G, the 
Seventh Circuit hinted that application of federal common law might not be appropriate, 
but applied it anyway because the “defendants d[id] not challenge that application.” Id. at 
748 (“The reason for this special federal common law doctrine of successor liability—
this departure from the more limited approach of the common law generally—is a little 
elusive, especially in a case such as this in which the actual violator is fully answerable 
for the consequences of the violation.”). Id. at 748. 
169 Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 781 (9th Cir. 2010). 
170 Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., 711 F.3d 763, 766–68 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
171 Id. at 766. 
172 Note, however, the many potentially “good reasons to withhold such liability” cited 
in Teed. Id. at 766. 
173 Id. at 767 (citation omitted). 
174 Id. 
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liability for violations of federal labor and employment laws (or, at a mini-
mum, the circuits may incorporate the state law of successor liability to fill 
the content of federal common law). 
Alternatively, two circuits have considered successor liability in labor and 
employment cases to be sui generis such that application of state corpora-
tion law would always be inappropriate.175 In Cobb v. Contract Transport, 
Inc.,176 the Sixth Circuit held that “[s]uccessor liability under the [Family 
and Medical Leave Act] ... derives from labor law, not corporate law .... 
Labor cases, whose holdings were later applied to Title VII cases, apply an 
equitable, policy driven approach to successor liability that has very little 
connection to the concept of successor liability in corporate law.”177 The 
Ninth Circuit followed Cobb: “The inquiry is not merely whether the new 
employer is a ‘successor’ in the strict corporate-law sense of the term. The 
successorship inquiry in the labor-law context is much broader.”178 
Even in this view of the doctrine, however, successor liability in labor 
and employment cases is cabined by the peculiar policies underlying the 
field.179 Thus, this conception of successor liability in labor and employ-
ment cases is not analogous to the other formulations of successor liability 
discussed in this Article—including successor liability under the FCPA. 
c. Enforcement of Patent Judgments 
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to have analyzed successor liabil-
ity in the context of the federal patent regime.180 In Mickwoski v. Visi-Trak 
Worldwide, LLC, 181  the plaintiff obtained a multi-million dollar patent 
infringement judgment against Visi-Trak Corporation (VTC). Visi-Trak 
                                                                                                                         
175 See Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2010); Cobb v. 
Contract Transport, Inc., 452 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2006). 
176 452 F.3d at 551. 
177 Id. 
178 Sullivan, 623 F.3d at 781. 
179 See New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Within fed-
eral law, the substantial continuity doctrine is well established in the area of labor law .... 
However, the labor law cases are particular to the labor law context and therefore have not 
been and cannot easily be extended to other areas of federal common law.” (citation omitted)). 
The unique origin of the substantial continuity exception in federal labor law has not pre-
vented some courts from blurring its distinction from the state law substantial continuity 
exception. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A]n approach 
quite similar to that used in Turner [v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 24 N.W.2d 873, 883 
(Mich. 1976)] is the one we follow in determining successor liability” under CERCLA). 
180 See Mickowski v. Visi-Track Worldwide, LLC, 415 F.3d 501, 509, 511 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
181 Id. at 516. 
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Worldwide, LLC (Visi-Trak Worldwide) subsequently bought substantially 
all of VTC’s assets, and the plaintiff brought suit to enforce his patent judg-
ment against Visi-Trak Worldwide pursuant to the substantial continuity ex-
ception to successor liability.182 Visi-Trak Worldwide wisely advanced two 
arguments against liability: (1) the “substantial continuity” exception was not 
part of the federal common law; and (2) in any event, Ohio law, not federal 
common law, applied to the enforcement of patent judgments and Ohio only 
recognized the traditional four exceptions to successor nonliability.183 
The Sixth Circuit agreed with both of these arguments. After reviewing 
Atherton, the Sixth Circuit effectively held that the plaintiff could not es-
tablish conflict, the sine qua non of the Kimbell Foods test: “the mere fact 
that the ‘substantial continuity’ test of federal common law is more encom-
passing than the ‘mere continuation’ test of state common law does not 
demonstrate a ‘significant conflict between some federal policy or interest 
and the use of state law.’”184 The Sixth Circuit’s opinion also cabined the 
substantial continuity exception to labor and employment law: 
Because federal patent laws do not speak to the issue of successor lia-
bility, there is little basis to abrogate the general rule derived from state 
common law that substantial continuity is insufficient to impose liability. 
The substantial continuity test has gained widespread acceptance only 
in the narrow areas of labor law, employment discrimination law, and 
pension benefit litigation.185 
3. The Application of Kimbell Foods to Successor Liability 
Under the FCPA 
As described above, federal courts have become increasingly skeptical 
about creating a federal rule of successor liability where a statute is silent. 
Scholars are mostly in accord with the courts.186 With these decisions and 
views in mind, the next step is to apply the three Kimbell Foods factors to 
                                                                                                                         
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 509–10. 
184 Id. at 511–12 (quoting Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 519 U.S. 213 
(1997)). 
185 Id. at 515; see also Storage & Office Sys., LLC v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 2d 
955, 963 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (stating that “[t]he government’s theory of successor liability is 
grounded in labor law decisions and appears to have little or no application outside of the 
employment context.”). 
186 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 130, at 558 (“Under the approach taken by most states, 
an entity that buys a corporation’s assets in good faith will be liable either for all of the 
corporation’s debts or for none of them. If a federal statute says nothing about successor 
liability, courts should hesitate before inferring that it departs from this general principle.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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common law successor liability under the FCPA: “(1) whether the [FCPA], 
by its very nature, required uniformity; (2) whether application of state law 
would frustrate specific objectives of the [FCPA]; and (3) whether appli-
cation of uniform federal law would disrupt existing commercial relations 
predicated on state law.”187 
a. Uniformity 
Concerns about uniformity essentially ask the court to consider the po-
tential benefits of a uniform law. In the case of successor liability, a uniform 
law would benefit buyers and sellers of assets. Asset purchasers and sellers 
would know which test for successor liability applied to their transactions 
and could appropriately allocate risks (or simply forgo transactions).188 
The relevant inquiry under Kimbell Foods, however, is whether the federal 
program requires uniformity, not whether uniformity would have some bene-
fits to private actors.189 Additionally, simply easing federal enforcers’ litiga-
tion costs and research is insufficient to establish a need for uniformity.190 
Furthermore, the adoption of a universal rule may not meaningfully en-
hance certainty at all. In Kamen, the Supreme Court rejected a universal de-
mand rule for derivative suits in part because such a rule would necessitate 
judicial review “somewhere down the road,” before the board of directors 
could appreciate the true effect of a demand.191 Similarly, in the successor 
liability context, imposition of the “substantial continuity” exception may 
decrease certainty.192 Under the traditional exceptions to successor liability, 
                                                                                                                         
187 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F. 3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979)). 
188 But see New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 2003) (Leval, 
J., concurring) (“It would be quite mistaken to view these instances as involving the use of 
a pre-existing [substantial continuity] test of clear, well-understood contours, which courts 
have plugged into first one, then another statutory scheme. To the contrary, in the case of 
each statutory scheme, the courts, perceiving the inadequacy of the common law rules to 
support the objectives of the particular statute, have groped case by case toward a new stan-
dard, sometimes following the lead of the administrative agency charged with front-line 
administration of the statute.”). 
189 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728–29. 
190 See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994) (“Uniformity of law 
might facilitate the FDIC’s nationwide litigation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state 
research and reducing uncertainty—but if the avoidance of [these] ordinary consequences 
qualified as an identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in ‘federal common-law’ 
rules.”); see also Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501 (11th Cir. 
1996) (“Adopting a uniform rule would, perhaps, expedite enforcement of CERCLA by 
decreasing uncertainty in assessing liability under the statute. But this argument could be 
made for adopting a uniform rule in the context of just about any federal statute.”). 
191 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 105 (1991). 
192 Redwing, 94 F.3d at 1501. 
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a bona fide, arm’s-length purchaser can be relatively certain that it will not be 
held to have assumed FCPA liability merely by acquiring assets.193 Under 
the “substantial continuity” exception, however, the acquirer would need to 
hold its breath for judicial review of whether, within the definition of the 
FCPA, it “knew” of the liability prior to the purchase.194 
Finally, it is not clear that the uniformity of state laws is even the appro-
priate question. The Second Circuit has stated that “variations in rules among 
states do not prove a need for uniformity ‘as long as the applicable standard 
is applied evenhandedly to particular disputes.’”195 
In sum, the uniformity factor does not weigh in favor of a purely federal 
rule of FCPA successor liability.196 Even if it did, it would carry little weight, 
as uniformity is “the most generic (and lightly invoked)” of the Kimbell 
Foods prongs.197 
b. Frustration of Federal Law 
As an initial matter, the mere fact that the FCPA is a federal statute 
does not mean that a federal rule of decision should apply to issues of 
                                                                                                                         
193 Grimm, supra note 28, at 283–84. 
194 Consider, in particular, the situation of a purchaser which conducts extensive due 
diligence, but does not uncover the liability until after closing. Because knowledge can be 
inferred from circumstances, the government may argue that the diligence is evidence of 
knowledge. See id. at 290 (“[M]erely being a ‘substantial continuation’ can lead to an infer-
ence of the acquirer’s knowledge of the seller’s wrongdoing, such that liability moves with 
the assets, even if actual knowledge is absent .... The danger is heightened in cases where 
even the most thorough due diligence may not reveal wrongdoing cloaked in secrecy—
such as violations of the export control laws or the FCPA.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Upholsters’ Int’l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323, 
1329–30 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the substantial continuity exception and reversing sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant in part because seller’s employee with knowledge of 
liability “had at least one meeting and a number of phone conversations with [buyer’s] 
officials before the acquisition took place, and that ‘questions about the company’ were 
discussed”). This is particularly problematic in the FCPA context, where there is a broad 
statutory definition of knowledge. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(B), 78dd-2(h)(3)(B) 
(2012) (“When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an 
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the ex-
istence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstances 
does not exist.”). 
195 Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Wilson v. 
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673 (1979)). 
196 In an oft-cited CERCLA case involving successor liability, the United States ac-
knowledged in an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit that, “the law in the fifty states on corpo-
rate dissolution and successor liability is largely uniform.” Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
197 O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994). 
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successor liability: “The existence of a complex federal statutory scheme 
does not automatically show that Congress intended to fill its gaps with 
rules of federal common law.”198 Instead, for a federal law of successor 
liability to apply, the incorporation of state law must frustrate the purpose 
of the FCPA.199 
One argument is that a muscular view of successor liability encourages 
would-be acquirers to voluntarily disclose more FCPA violations to the gov-
ernment. For example, in Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global Momentum 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Professors Kennedy and Danielsen 
endorse an Opinion Procedure release in which an acquirer agreed to self-
report pre-acquisition FCPA violations that it discovered after the transac-
tion closed.200 The DOJ and SEC also touted this Opinion Procedure release 
in the Resource Guide.201 This paradigm effectively conscripts acquirers to 
root out and disclose FCPA violations of potential targets.202 In light of the 
pressure to voluntarily report pre-acquisition violations, an expansive doc-
trine of successor liability might result in more violations being brought to 
the attention of the government. 
Showing that expansive successor liability arguably could further con-
gressional intent is not the same thing as showing that state law conflicts 
with a specific federal objective, however.203 As one commentator has said 
                                                                                                                         
198 Marsh, 499 F.3d at 178–81 (applying state common law of veil-piercing to 
CERCLA litigation). 
199 Cf. Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(“CERCLA, however, does not purport to be a source of partnership law. Thus, CERCLA 
does not require that federal law displace state laws governing the liability of limited part-
ners unless these laws permit action prohibited by the Act, or unless ‘their application 
would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action.’”). 
200 David Kennedy & Dan Danielsen, Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global Momen-
tum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 55 (2011), 
available at http://www.harvardiglp.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices 
-FINAL.pdf. 
201 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 86–87; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE 08-02 (June 13, 2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf. 
202 Grimm, supra note 28, at 325–28. 
203 One of the classic cases on “conflict” is Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 
(1988). In Boyle, the plaintiff sought to impose state law “defective design” liability against 
government contractors responsible for designing military equipment. An existing federal 
law, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (2013), specified that the government could not be held liable for 
discretionary functions (such as equipment design). Id. at 511. The Court held that permit-
ting the plaintiff’s claim would frustrate § 1346, because permitting design liability against 
government contractors would “directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the 
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will 
raise its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly affected.” Id. 
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in the CERCLA context, the purported conflict “can only be about the de-
sire to apply the broader substantial continuity standard to reach more cor-
porate successors than can be held liable under state law as it stands. The 
motivation is therefore a concern of inadequacy, not conflict.”204 
Mere inadequacy is insufficient to find conflict in the FCPA context as 
well. For example, a judicially created private right of action might also 
result in more FCPA violations being brought to the attention of the DOJ 
and SEC, but the Sixth Circuit has rejected an implied private right of 
action under the FCPA and the government does not contend otherwise.205 
Similarly, the fact that the government might uncover more FCPA viola-
tions if federal courts adopt the substantial continuity exception is no rea-
son to find “conflict” between the FCPA and the traditional exceptions of 
state law. As the Sixth Circuit stated in Mickowksi, the mere fact that a 
plaintiff can bring more suits under the substantial continuity exception than 
the traditional state rule is insufficient to show a conflict between state and 
federal policy.206 
Next, analyses of the “conflict” factor sometimes discuss the threat of 
a “race to the bottom” amongst the states if state law is applied.207 In other 
words, incorporating state law theoretically could prompt corporations to 
flee to the states that have only the traditional exceptions, in an effort to 
limit their FCPA successor liability. Of course, as the Ninth Circuit has 
stated regarding CERCLA successor liability, “[i]t is unrealistic to think 
that a state would alter general corporate law principles to become a pecu-
liarly hospitable haven for polluters.”208 It is equally unrealistic to think 
that a state would alter its general corporate law principles to accommodate 
                                                                                                                         
at 507. Boyle represents a true conflict between state and federal law. In contrast, applying 
the state law of successor liability does not directly affect the interests of the United States. 
As described above, narrow exceptions may result in fewer cases being disclosed to the 
government, but application of those exceptions does not prevent the DOJ or SEC from 
pursuing the culpable parties (namely, the seller and its employees and agents). 
204 Stephanie A. Rotter, Making it a Federal Issue, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 427, 458–
59 (2009). 
205 See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028–29 (6th Cir. 1990); Resource 
Guide, supra note 1, at 105 n.21 (“There is no private right of action under the FCPA.”). 
206 See Mickowski v. Visi-Track Worldwide, LLC, 415 F.3d 501, 511–12 (6th Cir. 
2005); see also Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 183 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n O’Melveny 
the Supreme Court ‘rejected the view that the government is entitled to an expansive federal 
common law standard just because the government would win more often’….” (quoting 
Bradford C. Mank, Should State Corporate Law Define Successor Liability?: The Demise 
of CERCLA’s Federal Common Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1157, 1159 (2000)). 
207 See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, 159 F.3d 358, 
363–64 (9th Cir. 1998). 
208 Id. at 364. 
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corrupt companies. Indeed, some states have enacted laws criminalizing 
both public and private sector bribery—a step even more aggressive than 
the FCPA’s prohibition against bribing foreign government officials.209 
Any company relocating to such a state to avoid corruption liability would 
be unpleasantly surprised. 
Finally, understanding successor liability in terms of the traditionally 
narrow exceptions does not deter acquirers from conducting due diligence 
nor from integrating acquired companies into the acquirers’ compliance 
programs. Because of post-acquisition liability (not to mention the impor-
tance of appropriately valuing potential assets), buyers are incentivized to un-
cover any contracts, products, relationships, and lines of business that might 
be predicated on bribery (and thus likely must be terminated).210 Similarly, 
because buyers are liable for the post-acquisition violations of the acquired 
business line, they are still incentivized to swiftly incorporate the targets into 
the acquirers’ compliance programs.211 Accordingly, even in the absence of 
an expanded notion of successor liability, acquirers have strong incentives 
to continue engaging in due diligence and compliance measures.212 
In fact, an aggressive doctrine of successor liability might contradict 
congressional intent. In Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., the Sixth Circuit re-
viewed the legislative history of the FCPA and concluded that the existence 
of the Opinion Procedure “clearly evinces a preference for compliance in lieu 
of prosecution,” and “the introduction of private plaintiffs interested solely 
in post-violation enforcement, rather than pre-violation compliance, most 
assuredly would hinder congressional efforts to protect companies and their 
employees concerned about FCPA liability.”213 With respect to successor 
liability, a “white hat” company may be deterred from buying an FCPA 
violator, stopping the corrupt conduct, and integrating the target into the 
acquirer’s robust compliance program.214 Deterring such acquisitions with 
the threat of indictment would conflict with the congressional preference 
for “compliance in lieu of prosecution.”215 
                                                                                                                         
209 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 881 (West 2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3 
(West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (West 2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 180.00, 
180.03 (McKinney 2014). 
210 See Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28 (“[D]ue diligence helps an acquiring com-
pany accurately value the target company.”). 
211 Grimm, supra note 28, at 250–52. 
212 Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying 
Proposal for Imposing CERCLA Liability on Asset Purchasers, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 435, 454–
55 (1998). 
213 915 F.2d 1024, 1029–30 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). 
214 See Grimm, supra note 28, at 298. 
215 It is not only Congress that has stated a preference for compliance; DOJ officials 
have acknowledged the same priority. See, e.g., Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole 
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c. Disruption of Commercial Relationships 
Companies intentionally select their states of incorporation to provide 
greater certainty and predictability to their corporate law issues.216 Thus, 
“[t]he displacement of state law is particularly disfavored in the area of 
corporate law, because business decisions typically proceed in reliance on 
the applicable state standards.”217 Indeed, Kimbell Foods recognized that, 
“[i]n structuring financial transactions, businessmen depend on state com-
mercial law to provide the stability essential for reliable evaluation of the 
risks involved.”218 
Similarly, in mergers and acquisitions, the parties justifiably assume that 
traditional successor liability law will apply to transferred assets. Applying 
piecemeal successor liability law—for example, state law for tort liability, 
federal law for FCPA liabilities—would disrupt these assumptions. 
 Some may argue that the introduction of the substantial continuity 
exception would result in the seller’s potential FCPA liability being priced 
into the deal. The ultimate costs of FCPA resolutions are notoriously diffi-
cult to estimate ex ante, however. Commentators have described the trouble 
that companies have in estimating their own liabilities when considering a 
self-disclosure to the government.219 In the merger and acquisition con-
text, this uncertainty is exacerbated by the asymmetry in the parties’ infor-
mation, leading to a potential windfall for the culpable seller.220 Leaving 
FCPA liability with the selling company—and, of course, the individuals 
responsible—allows for a more efficient and just allocation of risk.221 
                                                                                                                         
Speaks at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Nov. 19, 
2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131119 
.html (“We prefer prevention to prosecution and we want companies to successfully rec-
ognize and resist demands for bribes and to comply with the law.”). 
216 See Cort v. Ash, 422 US 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law, 
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except 
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to 
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”). 
217 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kamen 
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 105, 111 (1991). 
218 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739 (1979). 
219 See Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA 
Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 394–95, 406, 417, 
425 (2011) (surveying negotiated FCPA resolutions from 2002–2009 and concluding, 
“there is a great deal of variation in the amount of penalties that companies face when 
they voluntarily disclose FCPA violations.”). 
220 Grimm, supra note 28, at 296–99 
221 See New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d 682, 694 (2d Cir. 2003) (Leval, J., 
concurring) (“A rule of successor liability that threatened good-faith buyers with huge, 
unpredictable liability would also impose serious systemic costs on the economy. Such a 
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In principle, a buyer could insure itself against FCPA risk, or cause the 
seller to purchase such insurance for the buyer. Reflecting the massive and 
unpredictable nature of FCPA liability, however, the few FCPA-specific 
insurance products explicitly exclude coverage for successor liability.222 
Indemnification and escrow provisions theoretically could be used to allo-
cate the parties’ risk, but the process of setting the ceiling for such provi-
sions would be susceptible to the same price-setting problems seen in 
estimating the liability.223 Moreover, the sensitivity of such provisions may 
result in the parties walking away from deals that would otherwise be so-
cially beneficial.224 
4. In the Wake of Bestfoods, Does the Kimbell Foods Analysis Matter? 
Each of the Kimbell Foods factors points towards the application of 
state law as the rule of decision for any federal common law of successor 
liability under the FCPA. Even assuming that they did not, however, it likely 
would not change the substance of the ultimate rule of decision. There are 
three potential sources of law for federal common law: (1) the law of a 
particular state; (2) the law of the majority of the states; or (3) analogy to 
other federal common law.225 In a case involving successor liability under 
the FCPA, however, each of these sources of law likely would have the 
same content. 
First, assume that the Kimbell Foods test militates in favor of the in-
corporation of state law—what would be the result? In one of the earliest 
                                                                                                                         
rule would depress the price purchasers would be willing to pay for assets, as buyers would 
risk acquiring massive hidden liability.”). 
222 See Charles E. Leasure II, Insurance for FCPA Investigations, BLOOMBERG LAW, 
Feb. 28, 2012, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/insurance-for-fcpa 
-investigations/. 
223 See Nat’l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d at 694 (Leval, J., concurring) (“Nor is the unfair-
ness that would result from the imposition of such capricious, arbitrary liabilities on inno-
cent good faith purchasers nullified by the theoretical availability of insurance .... [A]n 
arbitrary and unfair imposition of a substantial liability on a blameless party is no less unfair 
or arbitrary (although less drastic) when its impact is dispersed by the insurance mechanism 
among numerous blameless parties.”). 
224 The Titan/Lockheed matter is a frequently cited example of potential FCPA lia-
bilities torpedoing a deal. The government’s enforcement actions against The Titan Cor-
poration (Titan) arose from the company’s agreement to be purchased by Lockheed Martin 
Corporation (Lockheed). After Lockheed’s due diligence uncovered potential FCPA lia-
bilities, it caused Titan to self-disclose its violations to the government before Lockheed 
terminated the transaction “rather than subject[ing] itself to potential liability” for Titan’s 
violations. See Grimm, supra note 28, at 306. 
225 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 886–87 (1986) (discussing mainstream academic thoughts on the 
sources of federal common law). 
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CERCLA successor liability cases, City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical 
Co., the Sixth Circuit applied the law of the state of incorporation of the 
“plaintiff and [defendant]” to the successor liability analysis.226 Taking a 
slightly different tack in United States v. Davis, the First Circuit applied the 
law of the state specified in the asset purchase agreement because the parties 
assumed it would control.227 Apparently, the Sixth and First Circuits would 
apply the law of a particular state, and, as previously discussed, most states 
recognize only the traditional four exceptions to successor nonliability.228 
Next, assume that the Kimbell Foods test indicates that a uniform fed-
eral common law applies. In New York v. National Services Industries, the 
Second Circuit concluded that federal common law applied, but held that “the 
substantial continuity doctrine is not part of general federal common law.”229 
Even United States v. General Battery Corp., with its full-throated defense 
of a uniform federal standard, stated—almost off-handedly—that “Bestfoods 
held that CERCLA does not, sub silentio, abrogate fundamental common 
law principles of indirect corporate liability.”230 Accordingly, “substantial 
continuity” is untenable as a basis for successor liability under CERCLA.”231 
And, as noted by the Sixth Circuit, there is a good argument that the sub-
stantial continuity exception is limited to labor and employment cases and 
thus is not part of any general federal common law of successor liability, to 
the extent such a thing exists.232 Accordingly, even under a “uniform federal 
common law,” a federal court likely would not apply the substantial conti-
nuity exception to successor liability under the FCPA.233 
Finally, perhaps neither the law of a particular state nor a standalone 
federal common law should provide the rule of decision. In Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Brown & Bryant, the Ninth Circuit abstained 
from deciding whether state or federal common law applied because, even 
under federal common law, the content would have been derived from the 
“traditional rules of successor liability in operation in most states.”234 
                                                                                                                         
226 43 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994). 
227 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001). 
228 See Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 337 Fed. App’x 480, 484 (6th Cir. 
2009) (discussing the four exceptions to successor nonliability in Kentucky); see also 
Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, 294 F.3d 640, 649 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that Florida 
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229 New York v. Natl. Serv. Indust., Inc., 352 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2003). 
230 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 309 (3d Cir. 2005). 
231 Id. (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63–64 (1998)). 
232 Mickowski v. Visi-Track Worldwide, LLC, 415 F.3d 501, 515 (6th Cir. 2005). 
233 Griffith & Goutman, supra note 151, at 368. 
234 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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Because the “substantial continuity” exception is not the traditional rule of 
successor liability in most states, the Ninth Circuit rejected its applica-
tion.235 Thus, if the rule of decision for successor liability under the FCPA 
comes from the general common law of the states, the substantial continuity 
exception would be inapplicable. 
In sum, regardless of how the Kimbell Foods test comes out, the result 
will almost always be the same for arm’s-length asset purchasers: no sub-
stantial continuity exception, and thus no liability. 
IV. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND CRIMINAL SUCCESSOR 
LIABILITY UNDER THE FCPA 
Even if an asset purchaser has no civil successor liability for the seller’s 
violations of the FCPA, criminal successor liability poses an even greater 
threat. As with civil successor liability, the text of the FCPA does not provide 
for criminal successor liability.236 Assuming the rule of lenity applies, courts 
should not use federal common law to create liability where Congress has 
not provided for it explicitly.237 
As many have noted, however, it cannot be assumed that the rule of 
lenity will apply, even when a statute arguably is ambiguous or unclear.238 
Thus, the rule of lenity may not reassure asset purchasers that a court would 
not create and apply a common law of criminal successor liability. If it is 
likely that a court would fashion a criminal common law of successor 
liability for asset purchasers, the question again remains—what would the 
content of that federal common law be? 
A. Brief Review of the Law of Criminal Successor Liability 
There is one published federal case that includes a passing reference to 
criminal successor liability for an asset purchaser, although the decision is 
devoid of analysis. In United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., the government 
brought criminal Sherman Act charges against Ashland Oil, Inc. (AO) and 
                                                                                                                         
235 Id. 
236 See Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28. 
237 Cf. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 946 (1988) (concluding that, because 
Congress did not explicitly provide for concept of psychological coercion to be included in 
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238 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. 
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its wholly owned subsidiary, Ashland-Warren, Inc. (AWI).239 In 1968, AO 
began operating a particular business line within its own company.240 In 
July 1977, the business line engaged in a “massive, ongoing bidrigging 
conspiracy.”241 
In October 1977, AO transferred the assets and liabilities of the busi-
ness line to its wholly owned subsidiary, AWI.242 Approximately two years 
later, indictments were returned against both AO and AWI.243 AWI—the 
subsidiary and asset purchaser—pleaded guilty.244 Ashland Oil involves 
AO’s subsequent motion to dismiss its indictment on double jeopardy 
grounds.245 Unfortunately, there is no discussion of the basis for AWI’s 
guilty plea.246 Based on the facts described in the order, however, AWI 
likely could have been held liable under either the express assumption or 
mere continuation exceptions to successor nonliability—assuming that such 
exceptions apply in the criminal context.247 Accordingly, even Ashland Oil 
does not support the imposition of criminal liability on a bona fide, arm’s-
length asset purchaser.248 
In short, there are no cases decided by federal courts that meaningfully 
analyze criminal successor liability for arm’s-length asset purchasers, and 
the Resource Guide does not provide any cases supporting such a doctrine.249 
                                                                                                                         
239 537 F. Supp. 427, 428 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 429. 
243 Id. at 428–29. 
244 Id. at 428. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 427–29. 
247 Id. at 430–31. 
248 See also United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 937–38 (6th Cir. 1963). In Carter, the 
Sixth Circuit considered the corporate criminal liability of a parent company and subsidiary, 
where the acts giving rise to liability occurred before the parent company acquired all the 
assets of the subsidiary. The Carter court reversed the conviction of the parent and con-
cluded that the parent’s “acquisition [of its subsidiary] would not make it chargeable, as a 
principal, for a crime previously committed by” its subsidiary or an employee of its sub-
sidiary. Id. at 941. Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit did not clearly specify whether the parent’s 
acquisition of its subsidiary’s assets was accomplished pursuant to an asset purchase or a 
statutory merger. 
249 See Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28 (collecting examples of criminal successor 
liability for mergers, but not for asset purchases); Order Denying Respondents’ Motion for 
Summary Decision, In re Sigma-Aldrich Bus. Holdings, Inc., No. 01-BXA-06 (U.S. Dep’t 
of Commerce Bureau of Indus. & Sec. Aug. 29, 2002), available at https://www.bis.doc 
.gov/enforcement/casesummaries/sigma_aldrich_alj_decision_02.pdf. Sigma-Aldrich, an 
international trade regulations case, is occasionally cited as a potential analogy for criminal 
asset purchaser liability in the FCPA context. In Sigma-Aldrich, an administrative law judge 
used the federal rules of construction in 1 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5 (2012), to conclude that the Export 
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This absence of criminal successor liability analysis comports with an 
understanding of successor liability as a doctrine that is fundamentally re-
medial, not punitive.250 Proponents of civil successor liability often argue 
that, absent imposition of successor liability, plaintiffs will be left without 
a remedy for injuries that they have suffered.251 Theoretically, an innocent 
asset purchaser is better able to mitigate its losses than a consumer injured 
by a defective product. In criminal cases, however, this remedial policy car-
ries less weight because criminal law is fundamentally punitive.252 Thus, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that federal courts have not imposed criminal suc-
cessor liability on asset purchasers.253 
                                                                                                                         
Administration Regulations’s reference to “person” included corporate successors, includ-
ing asset purchasers. 
For a thorough deconstruction of the Sigma-Aldrich order’s analysis, see Aaron Xavier 
Fellmeth, Cure Without a Disease: The Emerging Doctrine of Successor Liability in Inter-
national Trade Regulation, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 127, 145–49 (2006). As Professor Fellmeth 
points out, a subsequent Supreme Court decision cast serious doubt on the use of the federal 
rules of construction in the manner in which they apparently were used in Sigma-Aldrich. 
See id. at 149 (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002)). Indeed, one of 
the few cases applying 1 U.S.C. § 5 to successor liability has been overruled. See B.F. 
Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 518–19 (2d Cir. 1996) (overruled as stated in New 
York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 682, 683 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Nelson, supra 
note 130, at 558 (2006) (criticizing the use of 1 U.S.C. § 5 in the manner it was employed 
in Sigma-Aldrich). Additionally, the government does not mention (much less rely upon) 
Sigma-Aldrich in the Resource Guide as a basis for FCPA successor liability. 
250 See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 781 F. Supp. 2d 677, 688 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that the punitive and “quasi-criminal” provisions of the federal 
Clean Air Act precluded application of successor liability for an asset purchaser); EEOC 
v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 193, 204 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The Court is 
aware of only a few reported cases dealing with the issue of punitive damages in Title VII 
actions involving successor liability, and all of them indicate that such damages are not ap-
propriate against an innocent successor.”). But see, EEOC v. Steven T. Cox, Inc., No. 3:99-
1184, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27160, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 19, 2002) (“Successor liability 
includes liability for punitive damages, so long as punitive damages would be appropriate.”). 
251 Matheson, supra note 83, at 407 (“A frequent justification courts use to support 
successor liability is that manufacturers possess superior ability to bear the cost of injuries 
resulting from product defects.”). 
252  See Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate 
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 427 (2007) (“Criminal law, after all, is reserved for conduct 
that we find so repugnant as to warrant the severest sanction. The goals of the criminal law 
are to deter and punish such conduct.”). This is particularly true in FCPA prosecutions, 
where money collected by the DOJ is rarely used to compensate victims. See William 
Jacobson, FCPA Fines: Where Does All the Money Go?, TRACE BLOG (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://traceblog.org/2009/02/13/fcpa-fines-where-does-all-the-money-go/ (“In reality, all of 
the fine money collected by the DOJ and the disgorgement and penalties assessed by the 
SEC go right to the U.S. Treasury.”). 
253 Imposing criminal successor liability also could conflict with the fundamental crim-
inal requirements of mens rea and actus reus. See Weissmann & Newman, supra note 
252, at 422 (“The current hornbook rule is that a corporation is liable for the actions of its 
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The mere fact that no federal court has ever analyzed criminal successor 
liability does not, however, mean that prosecutors would not assert that it 
exists. In principle, prosecutors could argue that federal common law pro-
vides for a theory of liability in criminal cases. As set forth below, however, 
even assuming that the traditional, limited exceptions to successor nonlia-
bility could be applied through federal common law, it is unlikely that a 
court would hold an asset purchaser criminally liable pursuant to the more 
expansive, substantial continuity exception. 
B. Finding a Rule of Decision for a Federal Criminal Common Law of 
Successor Liability 
Just as every discussion of federal civil common law begins with Erie, 
every discussion of federal criminal common law begins with United States 
v. Hudson & Goodwin, in which the Supreme Court stated: “Courts no doubt 
possess powers not immediately derived from statute; but all exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction in common law cases ... is not within their implied 
powers.”254 But Hudson & Goodwin’s prohibition against federal criminal 
common law has held up about as well as Erie’s.255 Even assuming that it 
is within a court’s power to fashion a criminal common law of successor 
liability, the court must then select the appropriate rule of decision. 
As with civil common law, one could imagine the rule being provided 
by a particular state’s law, by the law of the majority of the states, or by a 
                                                                                                                         
agents whenever such agents act within the scope of their employment and at least in part to 
benefit the corporation.”); cf. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(rejecting the substantial continuity exception in a civil case because it “brush[es] aside th[e] 
bedrock requirement” of a causal relationship between a defendant’s acts and a plaintiff’s 
injury thus “impos[ing] liability on entities which in fact had no connection with the acts 
causing injury” (accord. Baker’s Carpet Gallery, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 
1464, 1472 (N.D. Ga. 1996))). With respect to mens rea, it would be odd to effectively 
impute an agent’s state of mind to transferred assets—even assets such as goodwill and 
brand—rather than to a specific corporate entity. Of course, this oddity is already present 
in civil successor liability cases where the cause of action includes an intent element. 
254 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also 
Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1277 (2010) 
(“If ‘federal general common law’ is unjustified in the civil law realm, it is even more un-
justified in the criminal law context. All courts—not only federal courts—are obliged to 
show restraint in the interpretation and application of criminal codes.”). 
255 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: The Federal 
Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 1827 (2011) (“Numerous 
scholars of criminal law have explained, however, that courts necessarily add meaning to 
criminal statutes, and that the refrain against interstitial lawmaking relies on a ‘truth so 
partial that it is nearly a lie.’” (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal 
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996)). 
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true federal common law. Unlike the civil common law guideposts pro-
vided by the Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods, O’Melveny, Atherton, 
Bestfoods, and other cases, the Court has not extensively discussed the 
origins for the rule of decision in federal criminal common law issues, 
though a relatively recent opinion provides at least some insight on the 
Court’s views.256 
In Dixon v. United States, the petitioner was convicted of purchasing 
firearms while under indictment for a felony, in violation of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (the “Safe Streets Act”).257 At trial, the 
petitioner asserted the defense of duress.258 The Safe Streets Act did not 
provide for such a defense, however, and there is no other federal statute 
that defines or even establishes the duress defense.259 The government ac-
knowledged that the Safe Streets Act was subject to a common law duress 
defense, but argued that the petitioner had the burden of proof, as is consistent 
with the common law of affirmative defenses.260 The petitioner argued that 
the government should bear the burden of proof.261 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded that, in the face of 
congressional silence, federal courts look to the common law as it existed at 
the time of the statute: 
Even though the Safe Streets Act does not mention the defense of duress, 
we can safely assume that the 1968 Congress was familiar with both 
the long-established common-law rule and the rule applied in McKelvey 
[v. United States]262 and that it would have expected federal courts to apply 
a similar approach to any affirmative defense that might be asserted as a 
justification or excuse for violating the new law.263 
                                                                                                                         
256 Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006). 
257 Id. at 3. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Brief for United States at 10–11, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006) (No. 05-
7053) (“Because the concept of a duress defense is deeply rooted in the common law, it 
represents a background principle that may be read into federal criminal statutes absent a 
contrary congressional intent .... But consistent with the common law and its underlying 
policies, a defendant must bear the risk of non-persuasion of the issue of duress by 
establishing that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Indeed, the government 
also argued that recognizing common-law defenses is “at least in some tension with the 
Court’s longstanding refusal to recognize common-law crimes,” and that the “invitations 
to depart from the common-law nature of affirmative defenses should be viewed with 
skepticism.” Id. at 15 n. 9. So too should invitations to depart from common law theories 
of liability. 
261 Dixon, 548 U.S. at 6. 
262 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922). 
263 Dixon, 548 U.S. at 13. 
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In short, the Dixon majority looked directly to the federal common law as 
it existed at the time the statute was passed, without reference to subse-
quent developments.264 
Application of the Dixon rule to criminal successor liability under the 
FCPA would result in the recognition of, at most, only the traditional excep-
tions to successor liability. As an initial matter, it is not clear that there was 
any federal common law rule of criminal liability for asset purchasers at the 
time of the passage of the FCPA.265 Even assuming that Congress believed 
that the “long-established common-law” exceptions to civil successor non-
liability were equally applicable in criminal statutes, the substantial conti-
nuity exception and other modern innovations were not established fixtures 
of the common law at the time the FCPA was enacted in 1977. As previ-
ously discussed, the substantial continuity exception was a deviation largely 
restricted to federal labor and employment cases, as well as certain state law 
products liability cases.266 Thus, even assuming that there is a criminal com-
mon law of successor liability under the FCPA, the substantial continuity 
exception is not part of the doctrine. 
C. A State Law Alternative to Dixon 
Applying the Dixon rule to successor liability feels awkward, however. 
Because corporations are inherently creatures of state law, it seems odd to 
                                                                                                                         
264 This was not the only approach the Court considered. In Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence, he allowed for developments in federal common law, stating that courts can “assume 
that Congress would not want to foreclose the courts from consulting ... newer sources and 
considering innovative arguments in resolving issues not confronted in the statute and not 
within the likely purview of Congress when it enacted the criminal prohibition applicable 
in the particular case.” Id. at 17 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer’s dissent—which 
obviously reached a different result than the majority—applied a rule similar to Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence: “Congress’ silence typically means that Congress expected the 
courts to develop burden rules governing affirmative defenses as they have done in the past, 
by beginning with the common law and taking full account of the subsequent need for that 
law to evolve through judicial practice informed by reason and experience.” Id. at 20 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). Justice Alito provided yet another possibility in his concurrence: that com-
mon law rules that are not specifically addressed by Congress “remain where they were 
when Congress began enacting federal criminal statutes.” Id. at 20 (Alito, J., concurring). 
Clearly, however, none of these approaches looked to state law for the rule of decision. 
265 See supra Part IV. 
266 See C.T. Charlton & Assocs. v. Thule, Inc., No. 12-2619, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20393, at *5–6 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 2013) (explaining that the substantial continuity excep-
tion applies in a state law products liability context); see also Teed v. Thomas & Betts, 
711 F.3d 763, 764 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that when a case concerns a violation of a 
federal labor law or an employment statute, “a federal common law standard of successor 
liability is applied”). 
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assess corporations’ susceptibility to criminal indictment without reference 
to the laws of the jurisdictions that establish them. Also, applying a purely 
federal rule to the criminal common law analysis could, at least in theory, 
create inconsistent results between civil and criminal actions brought pur-
suant to the same statute if state law supplies the rule of decision for civil 
common law analysis.267 
Furthermore, applying state law as the rule of decision for criminal 
successor liability would be consistent with the approach taken by most of 
the merger cases cited by the DOJ and the SEC in the Resource Guide268: 
x In United States v. Melrose Distillers, Inc., the Supreme 
Court looked to Maryland law to conclude that dissolved 
entities still “existed” within the meaning of the Sherman 
Act and thus could not escape criminal liability for their 
pre-dissolution conduct.269 
x In United States v. Polizzi, the Ninth Circuit incorporated 
New York law for the definition of “corporation” when con-
sidering the criminal liability of a resulting post-merger entity 
for the pre-merger conduct of one of the merged entities.270 
x In United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., the Tenth Circuit 
used Oklahoma law to conclude that a merged entity had 
“sufficient vitality to corporate life following dissolution to 
subject the corporation to criminal prosecution.”271 
x In United States v. Shields Rubber, the Western District of 
Pennsylvania looked to Pennsylvania law when considering 
the criminal liability of a merged entity.272 
                                                                                                                         
267 See United States v. Cigarette Merchs. Ass’n, 136 F. Supp. 214, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955) (holding that merged corporation could be liable both criminally and civilly be-
cause, in part, limiting its liability to civil suits “would result in anomalous situations”); 
cf. Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A single 
statute with civil and criminal applications receives a single interpretation.”). 
268 Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28. 
269 359 U.S. 271, 272 (1959); cf. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 237 F. Supp. 
885, 892 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (holding that an asset purchaser could not be held liable civilly 
under a successor liability theory for the seller’s alleged Sherman Act violations). In 
Johns-Manville Corp., the government brought a parallel criminal action, which named 
the seller and its parent company, but not the buyer. Id. at 888. 
270 500 F.2d 856, 906–09 (9th Cir. 1974) (“We turn to the New York law to determine 
the effect of the merger in this case.”). 
271 776 F.2d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir. 1985). 
272 732 F. Supp. 569, 571–72 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (“Shields Rubber merged ... into 
Shields Rubber II, and pursuant to 15 P.S. § 1907, Shields Rubber II remains liable for 
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In the final case cited in the Resource Guide, United States v. Alamo 
Bank of Texas, the Fifth Circuit considered whether a national banking 
entity that merged into a state banking entity continued to exist for pur-
poses of corporate criminal liability.273 The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
federal, not state, law applied, but Alamo Bank cited directly to an applica-
ble federal banking statute, 12 U.S.C. § 214b, to determine congressional 
intent: 
The franchise of a national banking association as a national banking 
association shall automatically terminate when its conversion into or its 
merger or consolidation with a State bank under a State charter is con-
summated and the resulting State bank shall be considered the same 
business and corporate entity as the national banking association .... 274 
Thus, Alamo Bank simply stands for the uncontroversial proposition that 
where Congress speaks clearly, it can create successor liability. 
In sum, federal courts have already shown a preference for referring to 
state law when analyzing the criminal successor liability for merged entities. 
Additionally, using state law as the rule of decision for a federal criminal 
common law could reduce the risk of inconsistent results where civil com-
mon law also points to state law—such as for FCPA successor liability. 
(Again, this assumes that there is any applicable doctrine of criminal suc-
cessor liability for asset purchasers.) 
In the end, however, choice of law likely does not matter to asset pur-
chasers. Regardless of whether a court could select state law to supply the 
rule of decision or, under Dixon, is required to apply federal common law 
as it existed in 1977, at most, only the traditional exceptions to successor non-
liability will apply.275 Accordingly, under either regime, an arm’s-length asset 
purchaser likely has no liability for the pre-acquisition criminal conduct of 
a seller. 
CONCLUSION 
Although a court probably would not find an asset purchaser liable for 
the pre-acquisition FCPA violations of the seller, the Resource Guide con-
tains no such assurances. By failing to specifically address asset purchases 
in the Resource Guide, the DOJ and SEC seem to imply that, regardless of 
                                                                                                                         
all the liabilities including criminal liability, of the merged Shields Rubber Corporation.” 
(emphasis added)). 
273 880 F.2d 828, 829 (5th Cir. 1989). 
274 Id. at 829 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 214b). 
275 Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 649 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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how the acquirer structures the transaction, it cannot ensure that the seller’s 
FCPA civil and criminal liabilities will not transfer.276 
Of course, the enforcers’ silence on the successor liability of asset pur-
chasers may simply be because they have not had an appropriate oppor-
tunity to address the issue. Fortunately, that can be addressed easily through 
the FCPA’s unique mechanism for seeking advisory opinions from the 
DOJ. An acquirer considering purchasing assets from another company 
that is subject to the FCPA can submit an Opinion Procedure request asking 
the DOJ whether it would be liable for any pre-acquisition violations of 
the seller. 
Understandably, prospective buyers may be hesitant to disclose poten-
tial FCPA violations discovered during due diligence. Luckily, an acquirer 
need not wait for such a discovery prior to requesting an Opinion Procedure 
release, because the DOJ has already demonstrated a willingness to promul-
gate Opinion Procedure releases which show no evidence of a target having 
violated the FCPA. For example, the government frequently cites Opinion 
Procedure release 08-02 as a model for exemplary FCPA due diligence 
and integration procedures in the acquisition context.277 The release does not 
indicate that the requesting company had any evidence that the target had 
actually violated the FCPA.278 To the contrary, the acquirer in Opinion 
Procedure release 08-02 specifically advised the DOJ that it could conduct 
only very limited due diligence on the target.279 Nonetheless, the DOJ pro-
vided an opinion regarding the transaction. Thus, it appears that the DOJ 
should be willing to opine on the effect of an asset purchase structure on the 
potential successor liability of the acquirer, even in the absence of facts 
that suggest an FCPA violation by the seller. 
Setting aside the legal analysis of this Article, as a matter of policy, the 
government’s ability to enforce the FCPA would not be undermined if its 
enforcement position included a general rule of successor nonliability for 
asset purchasers. First, the government’s ability to bring enforcement ac-
tions against culpable individuals is, of course, unaffected by the rules of 
successor liability. Second, the government often will have the option of 
bringing an enforcement action against the seller, even if the seller has 
                                                                                                                         
276 Note, however, that the Resource Guide acknowledges that “[w]hether successor lia-
bility applies to a particular corporate transaction depends on the facts and the applicable 
state, federal, and foreign law.” Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28. Making room for 
state—and even foreign—law seems to admit that reference to federal law is insufficient. 
277 Id. at 29, 32, 62; FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION PROCEDURE 
RELEASE 08-02, supra note 201. 
278  FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE 08-02, 
supra note 201. 
279 Id. 
136 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:089 
dissolved.280 Finally, even under the traditional rule of successor nonliabil-
ity, purchasers will be incentivized to conduct due diligence and end corrupt 
practices, in order to prevent the corrupt activity from continuing after the 
acquisition closes. In short, the policies underlying the FCPA would not 
be hindered significantly by adhering to a rule of successor nonliability for 
asset purchasers. Moreover, if the DOJ acknowledged such a rule in an 
Opinion Procedure release, it would provide meaningful reassurance and 
guidance to many U.S. companies as the pace of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions quickens. 
                                                                                                                         
280 In Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the indictment 
of a dissolved entity by relying on a Delaware statute which provided that dissolved corpo-
rations are amenable to suit for three years after dissolution. 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959). 
